3 Cases

Regarding reading from “Contracts: Cases and Materials, Fifth Edition-Reprint” by John Edward Murray, Jr. LexisNexis. 2001.

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p. 562 = “Maxwell v. Fidelity Financial Services.” 184 Ariz. 82, 907 P.2d 51 (1995).

First review between around 4 pm CST and 5 pm CST on March 6, 2022.
Second review between 10:35 am CST and 11:20 am CST on March 7, 2022.
This summary composed this morning, March 8, 2022, between 8:40 am CST and 9:30 am CST.

In what manner are the elements of this case connected to accusations and determinations evaluated and meted out during the Congressional inquiry of the S&L Crisis of the 1980s? This case, in retrospect at least, appears to be a sort of “how-to” on “house flipping,” including via use of liens on fixtures within a house. Specific to consideration of this judgment is that the judge misrepresents the amounts involved in the matter in at least three places, including in the course of giving appearances of “reappraising” the value of the house, despite the fact that the alleged “merchandise” is a solar water heater within the house. That two liens were included in the “bundle” of documents – one as part of a deferred payment arrangement for the solar water heater and one for the house involving a mortgage not identified as being provided by the financier of concern – is illustrated via the manner in which the judge uses case law citations, as well as other authorities that are not citations of cases wherein a statute was evaluated for its legal application so as to determine a precedent for comparison, in manners that devalue the house while also allowing for the property of concern to be used [and] to be made available for use or consideration in other arrangements. Of primary concern in the sequence of citations is a case involving an individual against a gas and oil company, compelling the unasked question of whether the “merchandise” at issue was the solar water heater itself or the energy that was produced via the “production arrangement” composed of numerous original documents including a “security agreement.”

The case discusses the allegation of “unconscionability” but waits until the end to address what should have been stated upfront, at the onset – what is the expected performance of the contract? Despite the explication of the considerations of unconscionability and the fact that the judge “opened the door” to concerns regarding “oppressive bargaining” or “bad faith” in engaging the contract, the judge waits until the end of the case to address what place [there is for] considerations of how “it may be more appropriate to analyze the claims under doctrines of fraud, misrepresentation, duress, and mistake, although such irregularities can make a case of procedural unconscionability.” Is that NOT just what was requested of the court at the onset to consider? There is no discussion of the role of disclosure or willful misrepresentation of intent in the process of consideration regarding the contract, which also speaks to procedural unconscionability.

The “verdict” determines to “leave for another day the questions involving remedy,” but does “assess” at the end another relationship, this time to the “solar water heater” as “furniture.” In the meantime, however, the house has been misappraised, subjected to manipulation of timelines – including ones that may or may not have been evaluated for performance relative to use of the “bundle” of documents as derivatives in portfolios comparing performance with others so used that were not disclosed at the onset of the contract and are not “considered” at all in this judgment – that qualify for conversion to and through a production agreement (see the case it references for details [C below]) that is sent to be managed pending eviction and goes to another financial institution. The “mistakes” in the typography in the specific text actually demonstrate “coding” for such “replacement” and in the end, after the foreclosure, the conversion does not close and the plaintiff is left with an asset that is significantly devalued based upon the initial assessment of the sort of financial relationship she – and her husband – were initially determined to be qualified for.

As another matter of concern regarding “hidden clauses” – including insofar as they may be connected to derivative applications for a “production arrangement” – is the judge’s citation of an article from a law review instead of the specific statute (as quoted elsewhere [in the case]) or case citation. The article in the law review references a professor [and is] quoted by still another authority that does not cite statute or precedent via case determination. I disclose that I have had articles I wrote for an urban newspaper cited in at least two different articles from law reviews. I have read these articles in the context of evaluating how a legal scholar would relate information from media publications discussing federal investigations and criminal trials via application of federal law. Whose “production arrangement” gets “flipped” based on my “performance” for a “contract” I have never read?

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p. 588 = “U.S. Nursing Corp. v. Saint Joseph Medical Center.” 39 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 1994).

This case presents a claim by a third-party provider of labor services for professionals in the medical sector that had been lapsed in regards to its legal licensing for a period of time before contracting with a medical center. The plaintiff claimed breach of contract in that “requirements for obtaining a nurse agency license demonstrate the Licensing Act is primarily ‘business related’ and not intended to protect the public.” Despite this, the company represents itself to be capable of and to provide qualified medical professionals, including ones that have their certifications and licenses in legal compliance. That a third-party contractor of the services involving the issues of “public good” as ones pertaining to healthcare treatment are is permitted to do so under a context of not bearing responsibility for the effect it may have on provision of services by the professionals it purports to be able to provide to the medical center is not addressed in this case, however, as it discussed in the case, the Nurse Agency Licensing Act does require certain standards be met which require for the plaintiff to meet other legal standards necessary to do business at all. Specifically, these include that the license will be denied for:

“(a) failure to comply with the minimum standards set forth by this Act or its rules…

(c) insufficient financial or other resources to operate the nurse agency in accordance with the requirements of this [Nursing Agency Licensing] Act and the minimum standards, rules, and regulations promulgated thereunder; or

(d) failure to establish appropriate personnel policies and procedures for selecting nurses and certified aides for employment, assignment and referral.”

Those requirements, included in an explication above [as well as positioned in the case above the possible reasons for denial of license], are “(3) the names of the proposed agency’s managers and supervisors, (4) statement of financial solvency…(6) a statement outlining the applicant’s qualifications to run a nurse agency, (7) evidence of compliance with state and federal laws, (8) evidence of liability insurance…”

In order for those requirements to be met would be an evaluation and determination of the company’s demonstrated compliance with laws regarding incorporation, including disclosures to the public or shareholders, for which the matter of licensing is relevant. In this case, there are specific time periods wherein the company is contracted with the [medical center], giving appearances of qualifying for the contract with the company. This is not just a matter of providing services for the [medical center] alone, but rather a consideration of whether through its appearances of qualifying to contract with the [medical center] it is leveraging that it is qualified to work with others. Can a company that does not comply with legal requirements around licensing be trusted to provide services by or in [regards to] personnel that are by law required to themselves be certified and licensed?

Additionally, in this case, the citations reveal the piqued nature of this concern. Three consecutive case citations regarding contracts for construction of a building or in connection with a building are provided for comparison, including in consideration of procedural concerns regarding the legitimacy of the contracts and their enforceability based on the licensing status of one of the parties. But, these cases, as well as the performance of the contract, take time to mete out and during that time services are rendered at one quality and quantity or another. A carpenter obtaining a building permit for remodeling; a contractor failing to acquire a permit per municipal ordinance; and a repairman’s contract being upheld despite lacking a license are not provision of nursing care or other medical services. The statement that “U.S. Nursing merely seeks recovery of what amounts to a penalty provision for the termination of the contract without sufficient notice” means something quite significant in this context. How long one can go without electricity means something different for the contractor of nurses than the contractor of

electricians. Both, however, as a “matter of doing business” have to apply laws for incorporation.

First review between around 5 pm CST and 6 pm CST on March 6, 2022.
This summary composed this morning, March 8, 2022, between 9:30 am CST and 10:30 am CST.

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P. 572 = “Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp.” 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976).

The major question in this case is: did the sales representative contract with the plaintiff with the expectation of the plaintiff agreeing to take delivery of gasoline with water in it? And, did the plaintiff sign the contract in agreement to take delivery of the gasoline with water in it? The other matters recounted in this judgment need to be evaluated relative to the facts pertaining to the judge’s determination of the plaintiff’s charges, which were not disputed, that the “dealer contract was destroyed by the fire” and that the “fire was caused by events following the defendant’s delivery of gasoline containing water.” Insofar as the allegations are not refuted and permitted to be presented as fact, then the nature of the contract of concern, including the procedural and substantive unconscionability claims, needs to be evaluated based on what the contract is for, ie., what it the “merchandise” that the company is expecting the contractor to take delivery of?

All other questions should be evaluated from there.

Is this a contract to commit to a crime?

First review between around 4:30 pm CST and 5:30 pm CST on March 7, 2022.
This summary composed this morning March 8, 2022, between 10 am CST and 10:10 am CST.

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11:23 am CST

March 8, 2022

Charity Colleen Crouse

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11:35 am CST