Regarding Delegations in Support of “Building a Better America (Build.gov) Open and Upcoming Infrastructure Funding Opportunities
To:
Secretary James Luecht
Under Secretary Erin Coyne
Under Secretary Michael Rabinowitz
Attorney General Touffic Haddad
Please review the proposals for the Department of Interior relative to the political and constitutional issues that have already been discussed and in accordance with administration strategy that was first defined in January of 2023 and followed up on in April of 2023 as well as throughout June and July of 2023.
To:
Secretary Brian Straight
Attorney General Touffic Haddad
We will need together to review the one-year to one-year and a quarter progress of the convictions of the three companies formally indicted in May of 2022 and adjudged by the end of July of 2022. The appeal periods have been exhausted and at this time the transition should already have completed its first six-month period and is now halfway through a second six-month period, relative to the 90 days following the final judgment for which an appeal period consideration was set aside. I will also need Secretary Straight to coordinate with Secretary Luecht and Undersecretaries Coyne and Rabinowitz independent of their coordinations with Attorney General Haddad.
To:
Director Charles Maranon
Secretary Tyrone Navarro
Secretary James Park
See Memo dated for 8.1.2023.
To:
Secretary Samantha Simonetti
Secretary Cordell Thompson
Secretary Katherine Jefcoat
See my information thus far on the status of the housing market and the attendant concerns. Please review the areas concerning the Department of Commerce proposals in accordance with administration strategy that was first defined in January of 2023 and followed up on in April of 2023 as well as throughout June and July of 2023. I will follow-up by Aug. 4, 2023 and again by Aug. 7, 2023 in connection with my ongoing efforts. We should prepare to meet formally by the afternoon of Aug. 8, 2023.
To:
Secretary Sandy Juarez
Please prepare for formal follow-up to your specific requests from April and May of 2023. I recommend you meet with Secretaries Wong and Feldman between now and Aug. 4, 2023/Aug. 7, 2023 to prepare by the morning of Aug. 8, 2023 to meet with me and whomever else you require to attend that meeting.
10:44 am CST
Aug. 1, 2023
President Crouse
​
______________________________________________
​
Re-posted at 1:09 pm CST
Nov. 1, 2023
President Charity Colleen Crouse
Attorney General of Texas
​
__________________________________________________________________________________________
​
MEMO
To: Director of Department of Homeland Security Transition Team, Charles Maranon
From: President Charity Colleen Crouse
Re: Regarding Transition and Contractor Concerns
Date: Aug. 1, 2023
Cc: Secretary of Transportation Tyrone Navarro; Secretary of Defense James Park
Dear Director:
It has come to my attention that there are matters that need to be addressed regarding what has become evident in the thus far very successful transition period. Thanks to your efforts and the efforts of your colleagues I am confident that we are well situated to address these matters and hopefully rectify concerns that have been persistent until this time. I anticipate that your leadership will help to set precedents that will secure and advantage people for years to come.
At this time, in Dallas, TX, there is and has been underway a local area rapid transport expansion for the “Silver Line.” A community meeting was held on July 13, 2023. Promotional material for this event is available at this time on the other trains in the system, however, until after the actual meeting I did not see any of this promotional material. I believe this may or may not be connected to concerns that are outstanding regarding a “Gold Line” project for Southern California that has needed attention for several years and that your experience would be well-suited to understanding for its implications.
Among the many matters of concern are the fact that the line is to transverse the northern area of the city, in a specific pattern relative to two other lines that connect the starting point and the end point. This is to cut down the total mileage necessary for one to get to one end or the other. That reduction, however, amounts to making the total transport upon the line a “26-mile long Silver Line corridor.” Beginning in March of 2019, concurrences regarding the local housing budget for the city of Dallas revealed a bidding scheme that connected the metrics “23” and “24” to specific demographics. By March of 2020, the specific demographic reference for “24” had been increased to “26.” I will be sending you a confidential report on the tracking of the “26” metric relative to this scheme until this time. New evidence has become available that may or may not be directly related to these matters but I will have to confirm that within the next few days before presenting it to you. At this time, however, what has already been acquired is sufficient to begin to address the concerns at hand.
For reference, please attend to considerations of the “Silver Eagle” line that is an Amtrak line that, among other things, goes through Texas, including through Houston. Part of the concerns are extra-jurisdictional considerations regarding law enforcement, which give law enforcement from one jurisdiction access to certain individuals in other jurisdictions that I understand compromise the ability for local law enforcement to be able to address the necessary matters within their own jurisdiction. In Texas, the context for understanding immunity protections for those that are employees of the state or its political subdivisions identifies that the “immunity for a political subdivision extends no further than the state’s.” However, these matters encroach upon federal jurisdictional concerns as well as exacerbate local efforts.
Yesterday, I personally was subjected to an electronic targeting in the downtown area. The battery on my communications device has been rendered incapable of recharging and I am not able to access the visual interface that displays the data. This has happened before, including in Fort Worth, TX, in July of 2018, after an announcement by members of the United States Senate regarding sanctions placed on the phone maker. The maker of this device is not until this time so far as I understand under any sanction, however, my understanding is that this is connected to a contract for “solid-state thermal energy storage substrates and methods for same.” The content on the communications device is also being used in connection with a bioremediation strategy. I am concerned that “competition” between Department of Defense contractors is being used as a justification to provide the appearances of “electronic” or “technical error” in order to interfere with my capacity to attend to my responsibilities. As you well know, this has considerable implications on the safety and success of our work.
I have already filed with the United States District Court in the relevant jurisdiction regarding the need to attend to matters pertaining to the considerations of contracting and compliance with law regarding contracting specific to the Department of Defense. These sorts of legal matters are the crucial and central obstacle to effective praxis regarding the Department of Homeland Security. I will provide you with all the support you need in order to address these matters. There are criminal implications that are attendant with outstanding matters that involve litigation that is and continues to be before the federal court, including insofar as it concerns the court system of an individual state under the constitution of the attendant state. I alert you that I intend before Aug. 12, 2023 to follow up on this with a formal filing as an appeal whose appeal period extends until Aug. 16, 2023. I will follow-up with you on the progress of this as well.
Attached I include an appendix that has an excerpt connected to the motion mentioned above that addresses policy concerns specifically. Please review it and let me know if you have concerns before applying it in whatever matter necessary for you to be successful and safe in your duties. I am grateful for all of the work you have done thus far and am more than confident of your expertise and judgment in following through. Please let me know if you need any additional information or support in the meantime. I will provide a formal follow-up by Aug. 7, 2023. I will expect by Aug. 10, 2023 a formal response from you.
The attached appendix is being provided as a copied excerpt that has not been edited from the original version I have in my records.
10:23 am CST
Aug. 1, 2023
Charity Colleen Crouse
​
​
APPENDIX 1
From Nov. 6, 2021 “regarding risk and contracting”:
From 235.006 Contracting methods and contract type (Part 235 -- Research and Development Contracting) Department of Defense Federal Acquisitions Regulation
…
-
Do not award a fixed-price type contract for a development program unless--
(1) The level of program risk permits realistic pricing;
(2) The use of a fixed-priced type contract permits an equitable and sensible allocation of program risk between the Government and the contractor; and
(3) A written determination that the criteria of paragraphs (b) (ii) (A) (1) and (2) of this section have been met is executed…
​
I contend that these terms have not been met under any circumstances. For one, there has been a protracted period of time in refusing to correct for mischaracterization of what documentation HAS been used. Secondly, even insofar as a derivative reporting could potentially allow for some form of “substitute compliance” then it is more than obvious that the substitution has failed to meet the basic requirements regarding compliance within the terms of the specifications that would be necessary for qualification in said domain. Third, even if it were to be accounted for such that the mischaracterization reflected a form of liability available for leveraging, the refusal to address the explicit terms of the parameters for consideration has permitted for inappropriate consideration of available methods for evaluation, as well as persons of concern.
Public reporting, as is mandated in consideration of contract bid processes as well as awards, also entails a responsibility in terms of acquisition of source materials. In the production determinants provided in the process outlined as part of the inception of the Wartime Production Act, among the matters of concern in determining whether or not to permit for something that has been developed to be shipped out are the considerations on the licensing and certification of the items after they have been approved upon final inspection. Without such available, then authentication of the item after it is “packaged” and then permitted to be removed from the site in order to be shipped elsewhere has not been provided. This could additionally provide unsafe handling in not authenticating the risks associated with shipping or opening the “package” upon arrival. It was at this specific step in the “inspection report” that I composed in early 2020 that was when I would have refused to allow for whatever the “product” was that was alleged to be ready for distribution to be sent out. That “inspection report” was stolen from my room along with a personal identification document before the end of February of 2020. The refusal of any law enforcement or regulatory agency to intercede for years prior to that and the subsequent refusal of any law enforcement or regulatory agency to intercede since has continued for the original risks that were mischaracterized to accrue in manners that are completely unsustainable.
In this case, the contractor has been unwilling to assume responsibility for the accumulated risks, as has been demonstrated for a protracted period of time. That the “default” then falls onto the government brings into consideration a substantial challenge in regards to the means by which the material that was acquired and used in the research and development processes was acquired. That also includes intangible property associated with using efforts for individuals to meet their resource needs as “research” connected to product development, including product development that may have a dual civilian and/or military use. In the event of a CBRN incident, the protocols for a domestic incident that were in place prior to the formal declaration of an emergency situation regarding COVID-19 and even before the time in which it was reported that COVID-19 was first reported elsewhere, certain processes would have “triggered” a risk consideration that would have required cooperation between the military and the civilian health and security infrastructure in order to maintain the outbreak risk as well as to assure against exploitation in order to promulgate another national security or international security incident. I contend that refusing to accurately reflect the national security concerns associated with COVID-19 as a form of CBRN-qualified concern has allowed for an increased risk that is evidence of willful fraud and other crimes with the aim of intentionally increasing risks associated with these concerns beyond a point that can be contained. I also contend that the material foundations for such to be able to proliferate were much earlier than the declaration of COVID-19 as is attested to in 18-0600, as well as even prior to that in regards to reports submitted in Texas but after attempting to seek assistance in reporting events from and in Illinois beginning in March of 2016.
If human services should be permitted to be contracted to DoD contractors, either domestically or abroad, or the contract acquisition processes for DoD contractors should permit for processes of risk leveraging that are so substantially unsustainable to occur, then not only is it that their protections from prosecution that should be contested, but that considerations of secrecy or confidentiality of proprietary information regarding the corporate persons needs to be considered relative to the risks those protections present to other persons, including individual persons who are subjected to speculation on DoD contracting without their consent or even without their knowledge. The burden is on the contracting party, and insofar as any service that is engaged in using DoD contracting ALSO receives federal appropriations without being subjected to DoD contracting requirements, then the consideration of the level of risk that the government agrees to take on needs to likewise be considered, including insofar as burden of proof of sustainability or legitimization is concerned. The government, like the contractor, must be able to prove that the risk is “sensible” and “equitably” allocated. In this case it is not.
The “demonstration” shows that there would LITERALLY have been delivered into the hands of what is at this point allowed to be declared as a nation under sanctions for national security reasons “products” that would be treasonable to allow for them to obtain. Additionally, the sequencing on this sort of bidding process has posited the “prosecution” on the refusal to distribute “stock options” that are based upon an earlier criminal conviction for trafficking minors IN THE COURSE OF TRAFFICKING MORE MINORS. Refusing to prosecute trafficking for trafficking and on the level that it is occurring, and to instead allow for the sort of risk assessments in regards to other characterizations of such crimes as opposed to accurately identifying and prosecuting them AS trafficking, has permitted for the accrual of unsustainable risk, even at the level that presumably such “risk” was thus far allowed to be legitimized.
Is using minors in processes of research and development in the course of DoD contract bidding “trafficking?” At what point do R&D processes regarding DoD contract awards take into account the risks associated with the research and development process’ long-terrm impact on the welfare of those who are used as subjects? Is using adults who are under the assumption that they are being provided with some service or are being engaged in acquiring a non-defense-related resource as R&D for processes regarding DoD contract awards “trafficking?” In this sequence, the refusal to address crime AS crime on the levels it is at while instead attempting to “leverage” offsets of prosecution of crime has only created incentives to increase the crime risk associated with the processes. The burden is on those who set out to gain from the highest level of risk engagement and correlated their processes accordingly to have priority in accessing the benefits of accrued risk credit due to the manners in which other levels of risk are addressed. I contend that means that ultimately, the burden falls on the contractor and the government when it comes to government acquisitions in regards to DoD contracting.
For the record: At this time, I personally have no personal identification documents and am locked out of my domicile wherein my business office is located. I am using a public library in front of the “young adult” section. This is completely inappropriate for these sorts of considerations. I specifically showed a print out of 18-0600 as part of an appeal to the person of concern who looked at it and asked questions. I explicitly stated that it has to do with trafficking people in connection with contract bidding that also involved potential national security concerns and abuse of derivatives. I contend ti is a national security concern to violate the civil and constitutional rights of citizens and to engage in fraudulent practices for acquiring materials from otherwise law-abiding citizens insofar as it attempts to compel, corse, or extort them into agreeing to commit crimes against their own country or aid and comfort the enemy.
In this matter, even the legitimacy of the national security functions of the state are called into question as the acquisition of the materials posited a false assumption that the person who had access to securing documentation and evidence that was meant to be used to prosecute crime was mischaracterized as the threat and defrauded while being stolen from and attempted for extortion into agreeing to conspire to commit other crimes. In the course of this, those items were NOT used to “secure” but rather to attempt further coercion and increase the risks associated with the scheme.
The conclusions for the failure of any “sensible” and “equitable” consideration--much less provision of basic safety, including in this case housing, food, clothing, and secure communications along with appropriate persons with whom to correspond and organize--leaves no other conclusion than that the government has been infiltrated in manners that jeopardize national security, intend to prioritize foreign interests over and above the interests of the People of the United States, and create as enemies what would otherwise be needed as strategic allies in the event of escalation or war.
If the government will not honor its contract with the People that is the Constitution and instead will allow for “contracts” with “contractors” who contract to commit crime to promulgate instead, then they have lost their authority to contract on behalf of the People. None of these contracts is binding.
4:11 pm CST
Nov. 6, 2021
​
_________________________________________________________
​
Re-posted at 1:10 pm CST on Nov. 1, 2023
President Charity Colleen Crouse
​
​
1:13 pm CST
Nov. 1, 2023
President Charity Colleen Crouse
Attorney General of Texas
​
​