NATO and Eastern Fronting - 1.24.2024
- charitycolleencrouse
- Jan 25, 2024
- 6 min read
The following was composed after listening to a speech made by Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Feb. 19, 2023. I did not originally post this specific reference in the comments. You will see the results in the video linked below.
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So I found this in reference to what I understand about the “European Shield”:
And what it invokes is a comparison of what Ike said about Poland specific to Western Germany at the onset of his role at SAUCEUR and what happened in North Africa. Specifically, that in the context of introducing American fighting forces to North Africa at the time it did AND in the context of France and its colonial relation with North Africa AT THE TIME that the Germans were attempting to invade, the U.S. had experienced a specific difficulty in that their material interest was not at stake in the same way and so the strategic aims of which all combined were capable were not considered in the optimal manner for accomplishing specific military strategic and tactical goals. Bradley’s perspective shows that the position of the individual leader was first considered in a context of national prestige that hindered the joint development of operational goals and oftentimes created a sort of “pissing match” between commanders that prevented optimal efficiency. The political considerations allowed for a stratification of the actual tactical capabilities and I now contend that this experience – and specifically the manner it impacted Ike in North Africa relative to later campaigns for which it is most often noted – were behind his perspective on NATO and WHY he left his role at SAUCEAR and resumed “civilian life.”
Specifically, I understand that General Eisenhower believed that some form of local integration beyond national designation was necessary in order to provide for the circulation of both tangible but also intangible value necessary to assure that each country was also able to stand for itself in the process of unification. The manners in which the Nazis were able to exploit the dissatisfaction of the apparent inequality of resource access and distribution relative to their understanding of their own was a real concern that Eisenhower believed would be exploited to hinder or impede European unity under NATO. I contend that we see this concern very apparent now, but have also seen it in the context of the “break up” of the Warsaw Pact and how NATO engages with non-NATO European countries. This is not JUST about “NATO” and “Europeaness” relative to the role that the United States would play, but also about actual tangible resource development and access that would define how tactics are understood and engaged. One example was provided by me just yesterday, including how symbolic references mean one thing functionally in one culture that may not be the same thing in another and hence actually impacts the tactical capacity for it to be well-utilized. This ALSO includes customs that are the foundation for tactical and strategic development and when not “integrated” and allowed to be considered for their military value impel a form of “egotism” that may be demoralizing as opposed to morale boosting. This is specifically evidence in the North African context, relative to the French and the German “relationship” with which the British had already had their initial introduction but upon the arrival of the Ameicans was not presented for consideration of possible praxis until AFTER the “Americans” had already been “entrapped.” At this point, the British pursued a policy of self-preservation that attempted to confine their efforts to overcome the initial obstacles in manners that left the Americans to come up with their own responses, but do so while an “American” had command. Eisenhower made his choices accordingly, but so too did the British.
As the Americans at the time did NOT have the same literal material interest – or risk – as say a country like Poland or other countries of Europe that were “on the cusp” of the border with the USSR (and also in a specific strategic view of the USSR as to their options and warfare/defense strategies) then they could “absorb the ego blow” in manners that the European countries could not. Eisenhower already knew this. The practical, literal, more local integration was necessary not only for an “espirit d’corps” but also for maneuverability and application. It gave “local stakes” to those in the field – including relative to each other – and provided a different sort of long-term incentive to their performance. It also “dissolved” concentrations of power and materiel that could be targeted by the Soviets for acquisition or subversion. When the major countries of NATO refused to apply this approach, Eisenhower himself chose another approach and we are now dealing with the results.
In some manners I contend the major problems that Eisenhower had with NATO are apparent in, among other things, the European Union debates on who is eligible and what time. What impact does this have on NATO? It is the “local stakes” element that becomes so of concern. What do the other countries “want” from a prospective new member? The less localized and more centralized the considerations the less likely “Europe” will allow itself to be identified with or as something less concentrated and less capable of being easily distributed. Nuance takes time and energy; regional distinctions take time and energy; “local flavor” takes time and energy to cultivate and do well. Representations – including those that are acknowledged for their authority and authenticity – can be more discerning and scrutinizing when those who have the “stakes” also have the expertise or experience. It is not a “performance” for them; it is not “tourism.”
The consideration of “risk” in terms of “it cannot happen to us.”
This is something the Soviets knew well, as when they recurrently attempted to engage the U.S. in discussions of “short- or medium-range” missile systems as an opposition to American demands to reduce their “interballistic missile” stocks. As Kissinger said, the European model was mostly in a “duck and cover” and let the U.S. and USSR focus on each other “long range” but this also led to a negligence – if not worse – when it came to responding to threats against “European” countries – or regions – that were not already established as such – “European.” The Soviets knew this and the world saw in Czechoslovakia, but to another extent, also saw throughout the 1990’s in the countries along the “Iron Curtain” not just based on what they did, but ALSO based on what the U.S. did – including to persons IN THE U.S. who were of origin from such places.
We see this now in a very direct and startling manner. “Ukrainian” people do not adjust on the “color spectrum” in the U.S. the same way “Iraqi” people or even “Palestinian” people do. The history of “whiteness” would have told us more, but we keep focusing on “blackness” and hence we destitute people before they are permitted to be “redeemed.” It is ethnic cleansing 101, but in a void of identifying an affirmative context for “American blackness” we are left with a refusal to call out the problem. “Europe” wants to pretend at this being an “American problem” and it effects how those who are already being “scrutinized” for their “Euproeanness” are impacted. “Americans” do not have the same risks and never did…but we also do not have the same threshold.
NO.
We have to address an appropriate understanding of “deterrence.” In this manner the above is instructive specific to the context of “assets” for a specific nation that are literally located in another nation. What defines the asset – including in the “national” interest – is as if not more important in some manners than what is done with it or what is capable of being done with it. I contend that when we focus on “blackness” a “nuclear” asset is not supposed to be a deterrent. When we focus on “whiteness” then a “nuclear” asset is supposed to be an acquisition. This impacts everything from our food supply to our immigration policy AND IT DOES SO THAT LITERALLY.
“Africa” was not “black” because of the African people who may or may not have been fighting with the Europeans – it was “black” because Germany chose to go black and SO DID FRANCE. This is NOT just an occult strategy that can impact matters from afar – ie., North Africa and its role on the “homefront” in Germany and the U.S. – but it is a strategy aimed at ACQUIRING WHITENESS by virtue of acquiring that which is “white.” It is ALSO the core element of the current biological warfare regime at work that alleges itself to be a “health pandemic.”
It is “white” to call it biological warfare.
“Healthcare” is notoriously understood to be the “bastion” of the “people of color” who are denied the legitimacy to exercise their rights to such things as standing armies and NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THEIR OWN. Health facility campuses like the ones in the U.S. are veritable fortresses and it is undeniable. When the rules around what is considered to be acceptable healthcare are permitted to be violated or vitiated then it follows accordingly that the fortress of concern will adapt itself. That includes how it “stocks” the “bastion.”
Where are the places that Russia has been aiming now if we compare what was happening ten years ago in Crimea? And what do the “Ukrainians” have to “defend” themselves?
Is this a “European” defense strategy? Is it “Asian?”
Is it “Arab” enough yet?
Who’s buying? Because we just heard “him” say it is not a donation.
To be continued…
10:40 am CST
Jan. 24, 2024
Co-President Charity Colleen “Lovejoy” Crouse
[9:28 am CST
Jan. 25, 2024
Co-President Charity Colleen “Lovejoy” Crouse]
Posted 9:38 am CST
Jan. 25, 2024
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