Emergency or Default?
- Charity Colleen Crouse
- Mar 15, 2020
- 9 min read
I was going to spend the day on one project, but I believe it is important to follow-up today on what I posted yesterday. In June of 2017 if attempted to file a legal filing with the Supreme Court of Texas. I later posted the main argument on another website I started at the beginning of 2019. I am going to repost what I put on that site from the later "Writ of Habeas Corpus" for perspective.
Excerpted from WR-87,139-01, "In re Charity Colleen Crouse: Original Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus," July 21, 2017. Supreme Court of Texas.
The issue of documentation is additionally at the core of Crouse’s second issue, concerning her request for the Court to consider the applicability of the Texas Organized Crimes Act §71.01 TPC in investigating the pattern of racketeering activity prompting this appeal and to declare it as in violation of the C21 USC §963. U.S. v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1987) states “...because of federal government’s treatment of marijuana, the RICO statute gives a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that marijuana is included as a dangerous drug and would serve as predicate of RICO.”
While at this time controlled substances that are scheduled as prescription medications for medical treatment may not qualify as “narcotics,” this case shows how and why they are “dangerous drugs” as defined through the above-referenced case and should therefore also be accountable to laws that define “narcotics” and distribution of narcotics per 21 USC §963. These controlled substances do impact brain chemistry and also contribute to behavior modification. Without adherence to certain standards, habituation to the processes of acquiring, consuming, storing and distributing such controlled substances can contribute to the proliferation of criminal activity in much the same manner as do those controlled substances classified as “narcotics.”
These controlled substances are distributed through hospitals wherein they are originally prescribed and shelters that refer or demand that persons residing within acquire a mental health assessment with attendant treatment involving controlled substances. The prescription itself creates a number of economic variables that can and are assigned to others to whom the hospitals and shelters refer persons in an effort to acquire additional resources. Programs requiring the acquisition, consumption, onsite storage and/or distribution of controlled substances and that are engaged in experimental behavioral economics testing must therefore be held accountable for the means by which persons acquire, consume, store and distribute controlled substances. This accountability requires caution in assuring that controlled substances are acquired, consumed, stored and distributed correctly, especially considering that the intent of habituating persons to patterns of resource acquisition, consumption, storage and distribution are inherent in the process of participating in behavioral economics testing modalities. At the least, this obligates providers to adhere to appropriate procedures so as to assure that the distribution of these controlled substances through referrals is not a criminal act. At most, it compels administrators to exercise vigilance to assure that they or no one from whom they receive economic or other benefit through the assignment to others of economic variables associated with the prescription of controlled substances are engaged in a conspiracy to commit a crime or are actively participating in a Criminal Enterprise.
That persons are then discharged from a hospital or shelter with a prescription to acquire, consume, store and distribute controlled substances upon exit requires physicians and providers to exercise caution in assuring that persons understand the dosage and side effects of the controlled substances as well as how to acquire, consume, store and distribute or not distribute the controlled substances responsibly. There are several policies and procedures for assuring that persons are prepared to assume this responsibility, such as adherence to the Health Information Protection and Portability Act and the Texas Patient’s Bill of Rights. Willful refusal to apply the precepts of these policies and procedures demonstrates a reckless disregard for the implications behind prescribing controlled substances expressly aimed at altering brain chemistry and effecting behavior modification. This is at best a form of criminal negligence under §6.03(d) TPC. Penalizing persons who attempt to inform physicians or providers of the appropriate procedure for prescribing controlled substances is a form of theft under §31.03(f)(4) TPC.
Forcing persons to remain in a facility while in deliberate violation of the appropriate legal procedure for doing so is a form of kidnapping per 18 U.S. Code §1201. Physicians and providers who refuse to release persons from a facility, permit persons to return to a facility, or refuse to permit them to acquire services from a facility for lack of acquisition, consumption, storage and distribution of controlled substances—or any economic variables associated with being referred to another service provider after being prescribed controlled substances—commit an additional act of extortion through “fear of economic harm” under U.S. v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1992). Sending persons from one provider in the network to another provider in the same network using the economic variables associated with the prescription of controlled substances as well as threatening to withhold resources or subject persons to harm through abuse of the legal process is a form of trafficking per §20A.01(d) and (g) TPC.
When an attorney’s client is engaged in experimental behavioral economics testing the means by which the client acquires, consumes, stores and distributes controlled substances require vigilance in assuring that they are acquired, consumed, stored and distributed correctly. Attorneys appointed to represent people who are onsite at a facility prescribing controlled substances are obligated to assure that those involved in that process follow appropriate procedure for handling controlled substances, including adhering to appropriate documentation requirements and assisting persons with attending and participating in any legal proceedings needed to assure compliance with the law per 18 US Code §1956.
Attorneys are likewise obligated to inform their clients of any and all rights they have in addressing any breaches and to assist their clients in pursuit of exercising these rights.
Regulatory bodies, such as the State Bar of Texas aka “Texas Bar Association” and the Texas Medical Board, are responsible for assuring that members of their organizations are compliant with legal procedures regarding licensing for the purposes of representing people who are prescribed controlled substances as part of involuntary treatment—as the State Bar of Texas aka “Texas Bar Association” is regarding lawyers appointed through the courts to assist people who have been given Orders of Protective Custody regarding mental health treatment—or prescribing controlled substances—as the Texas Medical Board is regarding physicians licensed to prescribe controlled substances. Regulatory bodies that refuse to assist with the processing of a disciplinary grievance in cases where the appropriate legal procedures are adhered to are thereby implicated as culpable persons in the pattern of racketeering activity per 10 USC §1962(c) and a “conspiracy to commit” per §71.01(b) TPC resulting from the distribution of controlled substances in the course of behavioral economics testing.
Further demonstration of the intent to distribute per 21 USC §963 can be asserted through an evaluation of various aspects of U.S. v. Sanchez 961 F.3d 1169 (5th Cir. 1992), including consideration of “1) knowingly 2) possessing the controlled substance with intent to distribute...” Shelters that refuse to hold on to patient medications demonstrate cognizance of the importance of the above tenets and how they apply to the consideration of prescription medications as controlled substances. There is thus an industry standard for evaluation of prescription medications as controlled substances for which such laws apply.
“Possession, according to Sanchez, may also be constructive if the evidence indicates the defendant’s dominion and control over the controlled substance.” Refusing to accept persons back to shelters without acquiring and consuming controlled substances regardless of physician decision and/or process for administration of controlled substances demonstrates “dominion and control.” Additionally, it is incumbent upon the administration in shelter services to assure correct procedure for prescribing controlled substances was adhered to in order to prove they are not merely exercising “dominion and control” over controlled substances in requiring them for provision of services or over persons by requiring them to acquire, consume, store and distribute controlled substances in order to receive services.
Refusing to either release persons or to permit persons to speak with another physician in order to be appropriately engaged in mental health “observation” and treatment in a manner that is in compliance with applicable policies and procedures is a form of “dominion and control.” When persons are continuously pressured to consume controlled substances without being told what the substances are, what the dosages are, how the controlled substances correlated with any diagnosis, or what the side effects are or be deemed noncompliant with treatment so as to have the detention at the facility extended is a form of “dominion and control” in an effort to compel persons to consume controlled substances.
That Crouse was denied discharge after inappropriately performed admissions procedures that included noncompliance with the policies and procedures necessary to assure safe handling of controlled substances and as a result ended up missing out on education, room and board that would otherwise have been available to her was a form of “dominion and control” and an effort to attempt to extort her through “fear of economic harm” into complying with the acquisition, consumption, storage and distribution of controlled substances.
Considering Crouse had attempted to discuss that she was and had been investigating what she at the time called “fraud” in the social services system and had apprised staff of policies concerning a) the administration of controlled substances such as prescription medications through adherence to the Health Information Protection and Portability Act and Texas Patient’s Bill of Rights, b) U.S. Presidential Executive Order 13707 concerning using behavioral science techniques for experimental transactional processes, and c) the importance of the Nuremburg Code in said processes, the burden of proof that the actions of those requiring acquisition, consumption, storage and distribution of the controlled substances are not predicate acts of the very sort of investigation Crouse had declared she was engaged with falls to staff per In re International Profit Association, Inc. (No. 08-0531). This is further reinforced by the fact that the nurse who originally administered controlled substances to Crouse had not complied with procedure and Crouse was the one who had to point out that signing the paper she was being required to sign in order for the documentation requirements of the detention to be met was fraudulent as she had not received the services that the paper said she had received. This is a second affirmation of the relevance of In re International Profit Association in regards to the burden of proof regarding the pattern of racketeering activity. That this burden was not met means that acknowledgement of the hold and events that followed sequentially as a result of the hold, or that acknowledged its validity by recognizing the referral, diagnosis, association with billing for services or other data coded to provide economic variables for assignment that were possible as a result of the hold, are a part of the pattern of racketeering activity accompanying the Criminal Enterprise.
An additional issue concerns the nurse then threatening to put Crouse in a more restrictive unit if Crouse did not commit fraud by signing documentation that she had received services in regards to controlled substances. Crouse did consume the controlled substance the first night after the threat of being transferred to a more restrictive unit, but the next morning commented on how behavioral science techniques were being used on those in the current unit through the wall postings at eye level of fee information without any additional legally-required posting of patients’ rights information. It was at this point that Crouse was transferred to the more restrictive unit and then told she was on an involuntary 72-hour hold. This demonstrates a staff understanding of the intent behind the consumption of controlled substances as a means by which to facilitate a financial transactional process using behavioral science techniques without the appropriate documentation or adherence to legally applicable policies or procedures, which also shows intent to distribute per the prescribing of controlled substances prior to discharge. As such, the following is applicable for consideration: U.S. v. Garza, 990 F.3d 171 (5th Cir. 1993) and U.S. v. Weston, 4F.3d 672 (8thh Cir. 1993).
One other instance of proof of intent to distribute comes from Crouse’s original while at the ************************************ to transfer to another shelter that was characterized as a “trade” but then reconfigured to be a “transfer” upon Crouse’s compliance with acquiring and consuming controlled substances with intent to distribute as part of the transfer. Crouse was denied the transfer once she declared that she had refused to acquire or consume controlled substances, and hence would be incapable of distributing controlled substances to another shelter. This demonstrates intent to distribute on the part of staff at the ************************************.
While at the ******************************, admitting physician Dr. ******* obtained a Consent for Information and spoke to **************** from the ************************************ prior to speaking to Crouse and had written on the Order of Protective Custody that Crouse was a) a harm to herself, b) a harm to others and c) incapable of making decisions about her treatment. Crouse, however, disproved the accuracy of these statements by 1) affirming that she was seeking to obtain assistance as she had been retaliated against for attempting to report racketeering activity, b) was attempting to report witnessing child abuse and what she called “fraud” at the time, and c) attempted to assure that her cooperation with any treatment was compliant with legally-required procedures and policies. However, the information listed on the Order of Protective Custody justifying Crouse’s hold was not provided by Crouse but rather contained details from the conversation Crouse had with ***** prior to Crouse’s arrival at the ******************************. This demonstrates that there was an agreement between ***** and ****** concerning detaining Crouse and compelling Crouse to acquire and consume controlled substances with the intent to distribute.
I have attempted to appeal this at least three times now. In every instance, I have tracked how instead of addressing the charges herein, the act of "filing" has instead been used in derivative acts connected to other interests. The charges were and still are literal.
9:16 am CST
March 15, 2020
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