Part 3 of Response to Comptroller of Currency Audit of the U.S. Department of Energy July 11, 1980
- Charity Colleen Crouse
- Jul 11, 2020
- 14 min read
Updated: Nov 8, 2020
Formal Notice:
I never was and never will be anyone else's "Political Risk Insurance."
Disappearing political opposition and harvesting them as your "political risk insurance" is illegal and I contend EXACTLY why you stole my reports and legal filings.
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Part III
Before discussing the recent audit, it is important to contextualize it within other recent reports and audits CURRENTLY available on the United States Department of State website. Reflected currently are many documents alleged to have been posted during the term of former United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that reveal:
a) An effort to reform or refine the United States Department of State pension and benefits system;
b) An effort to address factors concerning the permitting and development of the XL Keystone Pipeline;
c) A number of responses regarding the United States Department of State’s adherence to compliance with laws regarding countering human trafficking;
d) Several items regarding “cybersecurity” focusing specifically on laptops available to members of the United States Department of State; and
e) At least three reports on the performance of private contractors associated with “protective detail” that fit into a 2:1 paradigm that is frequently evidenced in former United States President Barack Obama-era policy and has persisted to the current day.
Later terms under other United States Secretaries of State reveal slightly different priorities. Has the United States Department of State “indexed” these matters ex post facto on its site to give a certain type of “legacy” to former United States Secretaries of State? That may be the case, but what is also apparent is that the reports and audits listed under United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton are distinctly different in terms of focus and priorities than those of the later United States Secretary of State John Kerry. Additionally, those that are listed as having been “posted” under United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also involve re-appropriation of factors that were considered prior to her assumption of duties as United States Secretary of State, sometimes years before the request was made for their consideration. Those earlier considerations make more sense if one cross-references them with information on draw-downs from the United States Strategic Petroleum Reserve beginning in 2005 available through the United States Department of Energy site.
The current audit is dated for Oct. 31, 2019. On this date, United States President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order “Improving Federal Contractor Operations by Revoking Executive Order 13495.” The Executive Order states:
“Executive Order 13495 of January 30, 2009 (Nondisplacement of Qualified Workers Under Service Contracts), which requires that successor Federal contractors in certain circumstances offer a right of first refusal of employment to employees employed under the predecessor contract, is hereby revoked.”
Executive Order 13495 also states:
“Sec. 3. Enforcement. The Secretary shall terminate, effective immediately, any investigations or compliance actions based on Executive Order 13495.”
In October of 2018, an investigation was requested by the Naval Criminal Investigative Services after a public announcement concerning a recently settled case in New York City regarding the award of benefits to first responders to the 9/11 attacks. Among the concerns that were requested for investigation were the fact that the announcement correlated with a timeframe outlined in a United States President Barack Obama-era Executive Order specific to consideration of “parental leave” and its relationship to consideration of awards of benefits. This was specifically concerning in consideration of database classifications that use a “parent/child” designation and the request was made in consideration that the announcement in the case may have been connected to the anniversary on the referenced Executive Order, dated for Oct. 31, 2016, and could be a manner in which “benefits” that were not ordinarily to be made available to federal or public sector workers were to be made available upon an ex post facto recharacterization.
This appearance of a potential form of Executive Office “kickback” scheme is apparent in the current presentation of United States Department of State-related data. That “all investigations” are to be terminated negates that the fact that federal agencies, like OTHER agencies, are required to report on open investigations within a certain timeframe in order to meet the requirements of certain kinds of surety and insurance. Failure to report within a certain timeframe registers as a “default” on the requirements of an agency, department or other entity to adhere to certain legal requirements, including those connected to the federal appropriations process. By the time of the issue of the Oct. 31, 2019 Executive Order, the person requesting the investigation already had “report numbers” that were provided with electronic account demarcators BY the Naval Criminal Investigative Service going all the way back to September of 2017 that had yet to be closed or answered; this person is also the daughter of a career member of the United States Armed Forces and has other family members who served both in the military and law enforcement. The United States Office of Management and Budget has a specific process associated with three-year reporting timelines. This needs also to be considered in the context of ANOTHER United States President Donald Trump-era Executive Order cancelling a former Executive Order concerning three-year reporting periods regarding allegations of fraud for federal contractors.
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When it comes to considering “Audit of the Department of State’s FY 2019 Implementation of the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014” there are two major areas for consideration:
1) That there are allegedly “inaccuracies” in reporting of transactions that are domestic in origin; and
2) That there was NO information available on transactions that were originating from foreign posts.
The data under consideration was for the Fiscal Year of 2018-2019. In the reporting, “Finding A: Domestic Data Submitted to Treasury Was Not Always Complete, Accurate, or Timely and Considered of Moderate Quality” identifies itself as being about data originating domestically, however, begins by describing how there was NO data available at all for posts of foreign origin. It THEN describes the details of the finding regarding domestic data.
The first paragraph of the section discusses “completeness, accuracy, timeliness, or quality” (p. 7) of data originating overseas. “The Department’s SAO did not certify transactions that originated at overseas posts during the first quarter of FY 2019” (p. 7). It is important, however, to consider that at least in the State of Texas, the acronym for the auditor’s office is ALSO “SAO” for “State Auditor’s Office” – for the United States Department of State “SAO” means “Senior Accountable Official” in the text of the report (second page after cover page; p. 2; footnote p. 26; p. 27; as well as p. 4 in Subhead with no acronym) but is listed in the “Abbreviations” as “Senior Accountability Official” (p. 42).
Then, in the second paragraph it discusses domestic origin data before a subheading of “Accuracy, Completeness, and Timeliness of Overseas Data” (p. 8). Notice that there is missing a qualifier at this point that was apparent in the earlier recounting, namely “quality.” This provides the considerations of “timeliness” with a specific function. This “pattern” has been apparent for at least the last two years in various paradigms and includes a form of “hacking” that redirects data from one chain or structural element to another at the appearance of whatever is represented or ascribed to the third element.
According to the second paragraph:
“The Department’s SAO did not certify the 7,894 transactions that originated at overseas posts during the first quarter of FY 2019” (pps. 8-9). Additionally, “[t]hese amounts represent less than 5% of the total dollar amount of all worldwide procurement and financial assistance awards executed during the first quarter of FY 2019” (p. 9). Again, there is concern regarding the overlap with demarcators specific to the State of Texas. According to the Texas Comptroller Code, the state is not allowed to allocate any more than 5% of its total budget per year to derivatives. Without specific contextualization of what is meant by “the total dollar amount of all worldwide procurement and financial assistance awards” (p. 9), especially in consideration of a refusal to identity the origin of “foreign” posts to accounts connected to or through the United States Department of State, then there are necessarily other concerns regarding “substitution” and “swapping” as will be discussed later. Among these was:
“Specifically, the CGFS reconciliation identified variances related to overseas data of up to 85 percent” (p. 9).
If the United States Department of State were using this system to engage in a hedging strategy with a 80/20 paradigm, then they would be coded to default one way. What then does that mean insofar as the auditor has presented the information in this report with an introduction to the FOREIGN origin data under the alleged rubric of considering domestic origin data only to discuss these sorts of disparities in reporting? This leaves open possibilities for significant hedging on non-certified “overseas” transactions. Does that enable a “transaction” to be able to “post” without “certification” so that it can accrue liability for future leveraging? And where are the major hedges set up?
By name, at least as referenced in the reports available within strategic timeframes through the United States Department of State, there ARE in fact specific locations where there are major benchmarks already set up. As this report does not seek to be itself a specific “benchmark” on any pre-existing hedges, they will not be listed here. There are, however, significant correlations regarding public notices on specific conflict scenarios and other economic indicators regarding those places, as well as discernible and predictive patterns associated with corollary conflicts. This DOES leave open the possibility for strategic interception in the escalation up to a potential terrorist event, however, it is evident that is NOT the intent of this United States Department of States report’s presentation of information or the manner in which it was accumulated.
The audit report discusses the implementation of a “DATA Act Broker” connected to and through the United States Department of Treasury. The DATA Act has been implemented for several years prior to the report; could that be connected to the manners in which priorities around reporting and auditing United States Department of State functions were designated? That is possible. But what does not add up is that the information input into the system regarding domestic transactions had a sort of incongruity that actually MAKES sense if considered with regards to concerns about illegal hedging, including illegal hedging that facilitates the conditions necessary for financing acts of terrorism.
First is consideration of an explicitly stated aspect for which the United States Department of State is alleged to be accounting as well as one not specified in the report. There are two distinct databases for the compilation of information connected to funding involving departments provided with funding via federal appropriations processes:
a) SAMS – mentioned in this report specifically as the “State Assistance Management System” (p. 6; Appendix p. 42); and
b) SAM – “System for Award Management,” a federal database for contractors not explicitly mentioned in the report.
Undoubtedly, the private security companies mentioned in the early United States Department of State audits would have had to engage the “System for Award Management” system in order to qualify for their contracts for any appropriations via the Department of Defense, as both of these companies are alleged to have done, including for the timeframe under consideration in the dates of the audits now available. But what does it mean if transactions being registered via the “State Assistance Management System” are missing data of the sort that is missing?
According to another section of the report, there was also an audit performed for Office of Language Services Awards. The audit of this system revealed that there was NO confirmation on ANY reports concerning the United States Department of State's language services for the period of Oct. 1, 2018 through Sept. 31, 2019:
“Specifically, of the 58 awards from the Office of Language Services with a corresponding record in File D1, [X] Williams Adley found all 58 incorrectly identified the Action Date to be the first day of the fiscal year, even though that was not the date that the award was issued or signed” (p.14 with reference to footnote at [X] not listed here).
That the information was compiled for a whole year and that not one of these was identified prior to the audit as having misinformation is specifically alarming. According to a United States Department of Defense Memorandum of June 17, 2009 “DoD Guidance for Reporting Questionable Intelligence Activities and Significant or Highly Sensitive Matters,” the United States Department of Defense is required on a quarterly basis to submit reports of questionable activities even if there are no questionable activities. As it states:
“2.b. Report questionable intelligence activities not of a serious nature quarterly” (p. 5). As it further says, “Quarterly reports are required even if no reportable matters occurred during the reporting period” (p. 5).
How is not appropriately inputting accounting requirements for language services at the United States Department of State for a whole year NOT considered “questionable intelligence activity?” Just as other departments are often called in to assist with an outside audit, so too must one consider how reporting standards on important factors impacting the security of domestic and international security policy can be contrasted between different federal departments.
The Memo from the United States Department of Defense also states, “Reporting shall not be delayed or postponed pending on investigation, command inquiry, or legal proceeding” (p. 7). Why was there NOT an alert about these “inaccuracies” within the first quarter of their reporting, at the least?
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Consider then the elements of the audit referencing “Global Business Intelligence” (pps. 6, 13, 23, 25). Among the factors that one would necessarily need to consider regarding any engagement for foreign intelligence efforts would be the relationships that are established and maintained by those who would necessarily need to engage in language translation. The manners in which information is presented in English are significant for consideration regarding what would then be made available for the consideration of a translator in performance of the role as translator. When processes of automation or financing for these services are considered, how then does a mischaracterization of the “performance” of those with whom the United States Department of State are contracted factor into maintenance of statesmanship or security?
Typographical errors are one thing when reading a written report in a traditional format acknowledged as being standard for public or official presentation. But increasingly, intelligence gathering and analysis, as well as commercial and other activities, are being automated. The “punctuation” involved with coding a computer software or other program that is used in delivery of security services can be severely impacted by errant punctuation, or what would otherwise be unnecessary information programmed into a command sequence that has no actual utility as a security feature, but may provide a sort of subversive communication of information in literal or metaphorical manners. The implications of these processes “embedded in the coding” have yet to be fully revealed and discussed for the profundity of their implications. It is, however, imperative to consider these matters with regards to how that information which is understood to be communicated to a non-native English speaker is presented. No organization in the United States should be held to account for this more than the United States Department of State.
And yet, the nuances are not meant to be apparent, as evident by this audit. The primary evidence of this is the manners which in the report itself the distinction regarding presentation of information changes when the intended audience changes. From a “global business” perspective this demonstrates at the least a “bad faith” effort to engage in any consideration, but more than that it reveals that the associations of information during the terms of previous United States Secretaries of State were intended to accrue. The question becomes how much of that was meant to be for the interest of the United States and its allies, and how much of that was about abusing the office to establish processes meant to be of personal political or financial benefit later?
When it comes to addressing the “completeness” of data that is entered, the audit discusses the “error rates” associated with the “Parent Award Identifier Number” (p. 12). It is notable that this term is NOT put into an acronym, even though the “Federal Award Indentifier Number” (FAIN) is (p. 7; Appendix C p. 35; Abbreviations p. 42). There is also no acronym used for considerations of “Period of Performance,” for instance:
“…other data elements, including Period of Performance Start Date, Period of Performance Current End Date, and Period of Performance Potential End Date, that were incorrectly recorded as the first or last day of the fiscal year. In addition, Williams Adley found numerous errors in the Federal Action Obligation data element” (p. 14).
It is also apparent that the audience was determined to engage in different considerations when addressing matters later under “Finding B: Implementation and Use of Government-Wide Data Standards Need Improvement:”
“As described in Finding A, the Office of Language Services used Period of Performance[X] and Action Dates that did not comply with DAIMS requirements. For instance, the DAIMS definition for Action Date is the date the action being reported was issued/signed by the Government or a binding agreement was reached. For Office of Language Services BPAs, the Department used the beginning of the fiscal year as the Action Date regardless of the actual signature date” (p. 21 with reference to footnote at [X] not listed here).
Additionally, the section ends with two references to “period of performance” as a general term that applies specifically for the Office of Language Services (p. 22), but elsewhere it is a proper noun designating specific categories for data input that where there were “inaccuracies” in the domestic input (pps., 14, 16, 20, 21 [including three times in the footnote referenced as [X] in the paragraph quoted above]).
Again the context for what sort of domestic posts are being considered is important. Many of the interests that are allied with consideration of the XL Pipeline have their corporate headquarters in Houston, TX. In Houston, the police pension system is called the “Houston Police Officers Pension System” and goes by the acronym “HPOPS.” It also has a specific board structure, wherein half of the board members are elected by the organization’s membership while the other half are appointed by the mayor. Is this a sort of corollary to the concept of “matching” government funding for programming via the United States Agency for International Development with “private equity” as was announced were to be the aims of United States International Development Finance Corporation in 2018 for implementation by the end of Summer of 2019 regarding United States Department of State-related functions abroad?
A final consideration of this audit needs to take into account changes that were made in recent years to policies involving the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, including as announced via the Securities and Exchange Commission. On Aug. 16, 2016 the Commodity Futures Trading Commission implemented new rules “requiring security-based swap dealers and major security-based swap participants to provide trade acknowledgments and to verify those trade acknowledgments in security-based swap transactions. The Commission also is amending Rule 3a71-6 under the Exchange Act to address the potential availability of substituted compliance in connection with those trade acknowledgment and verification requirements” (p. 1).
According to “B. Cross-Border Application and Availability of Substituted Compliance”
“the Commission also proposed rules to establish a framework to permit market participants to satisfy certain requirements by complying with comparable regulatory requirements of a foreign jurisdiction. Among these was a proposed rule by which foreign security-based swap dealers registered with the Commission might satisfy requirements under Exchange Act Section 15F – other than dealer registration requirements – by complying with the corresponding rules and regulations established in a foreign jurisdiction” (pps. 10-11).
What sorts of “compliance” standards are being addressed in the “foreign posts” being evaluated per the audit of the United States Department of State? If it is permissible for the United States Department of State to engage as a business entity in regards to its arrangements with other countries, then is it intentionally mischaracterizing data in a federally-required system within the United States in order to use these sorts of “substitution” possibilities to engage in illegal hedging involving security matters in other countries? The audit reveals a potential to allow for a “substitution” of standards in other countries when it comes to confirmation on a transaction originating in the United States and making any non-compliance or “default” appear as if it were because of the “standards” applied or enforced in another country. For this reason, any domestic opportunism or meddling of or in connection with matters connected to or through the United States Department of State become even more concerning.
That the primary domestic gas and oil consideration in the last decade has involved an interest explicitly included in what could be an “inventory” of United States Department of State reports on its operations calls into question other acts of domestic malfeasance and misappropriation. Civil penalties in lieu of criminal prosecution additionally become even more important for scrutiny. As presented, there is substantial evidence that the intent of the original dismissal of the United States Office of Comptroller of Currency’s audit of the United States Department of Energy regarding its uranium enrichment facilities in 1980 has indeed accrued with deliberate intent to create situations of default that can be leveraged in escalated risk scenarios that intend to subordinate vital “safety” and “security” to speculative opportunism from private sector entities.
[REMOVED].
5:03 pm CST
Finished proofreading at 5:51 pm CST
Here's the problem with your "Women in Leadership" development model...
If you are in a "developing country" then what and who are YOU that YOU would be allowed to be a "leader" when you are working with the United States that did what it did and DOES what it is DOING to women like me? Why should ANY OTHER woman be able to identify children to hedge their political futures on for the rest of their lives, and that child's life, even when that child grows up and is able to produce her OWN DAMNED BARREL? For some women, THEIR political future IS as "First Lady."
Stop.
YOU are committing violence against women.
No one has any idea what COULD have been MY political future because I am not even allowed to have a political present while you harvest me for your "insurance."
Posted 6:17 pm CST
Dallas, TX
July 11, 2020
"Typos" corrected by 11:15 pm CST
I do not support what was done.
There was a more appropriate forum for that conversation.
1 hack corrected at 2:41 pm CST
Nov. 8, 2020
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