p. 186:

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"We didn't have to take out the regime's air defenses. I argued to arm and train vetted opposition forces, which was something the President's entire national security team had recommended he do, but that he continued to resist. And we could use precision strike capabilities to target Assad's aircraft and SCUD launchers without suppressing his defenses. We could use them against artillery, too, and use Patriot batteries to defend safe zones from aerial and missile attacks.

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Would any of these options immediately end the conflict? Probably not. But they could save innocent lives in Syria. They could give the moderate opposition a better chance to succeed in marginalizing radical actors."

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p. 187

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"In the predawn hours of August 21, 2013, the regime fired as many as fifteen rockets at two densely populated rebel-held areas in the Damascus suburbs. They carried warheads filled with sarin gas."

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pps. 188-189

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"The President asked us to the White House on the following Monday, Labor Day...The strikes from carrier aircraft and cruise missiles would not be lasting but they would be big enough to degrade Assad's military capabilities. They were going to hit airfields. runways, SCUD batteries, and command and control, seriously degrading Assad's airpower, all the targets they had been insisting for years couldn't be touched without taking the regimes air defenses."

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