​

 

“The intentional efforts to obstruct Crouse’s attempts to report on child abuse and instead force her into a 10-day detention for psychiatric treatment/observation was an act of insurance fraud at the least as well as fraud related to abuse of Texas Health and Human Services clauses regarding “risk management criteria” and access to “risk assessments” (Sec. 35.02 Texas Penal Code; Sec. 531.051 and Sec. 531.0515, Texas Government Code). Crouse was told on her fifth day of detention that her detention was being insured by the Harris Center for Mental Health and IDD and was required to sign paperwork acknowledging the insurer before she was permitted discharge on April 3, 2017. Crouse was also that day compelled to listen to a protracted marketing pitch for Universal Health Services, Inc. in whose network Crouse was informed West Oaks Hospital resided. To have Crouse designated with a “mental illness” and treated accordingly in her engagement with attempts to procure support in the form of public services, public resources, or assistance with reporting efforts, mischaracterizes the actual risks engaged by and in connection with Crouse’s efforts and resource acquisition. This impacts portfolios or assessments of financial performance that access data connected to Crouse or that interact with Crouse in terms of providing or receiving resources from Crouse. This mischaracterization of appropriate risk factors also correlates with Texas Health and Human Services provisions regarding “legally authorized representatives” or “risk representatives” (Sec. 531.051 Texas Government Code) and potential abuses of the Texas Estates Code regarding access to intangible property rights (Sec. 1151.001, Texas Estates Code), often mischaracterizing Crouse’s private personal information and intellectual property as “public information” when in fact it is a theft of personal private property from Crouse (Sec. 31.03 Texas Penal Code). As such, any attempt to justify Sovereign Immunity for officials of the City of Houston or any private interests participating in developing public financing portfolios under Sec. 271 Local Government Code is moot and additionally implicates the use of the intangible and tangible personal property of others acquired through the same modality in correlative acts of fraud and associated crimes as detailed herein. Not only that, but by mischaracterizing the scenarios regarding Crouse’s engagement with the Neuropsychiatric Center and West Oaks Hospital as being about obtaining assistance with a mental illness as supposed to reporting child abuse to mandated reporters, then risk assessments provided for these organizations and all other organizations subsequent to those engagements are themselves also fraudulent and mischaracterized.

…

 

“Crouse had been in training to become a technician and eventually inspector of Non-Destructive Testing prior to her efforts to report child abuse. Many of the organizations for which Crouse was used as a derivative were ones with which Crouse should have been able to develop a legitimate, legal and potentially highly-compensated relationship as an employee or contractor rather than as a derivative financial instrument that was unlicensed and used for public debt service, as Crouse was via issuance of the forged documents. Additionally, that her use as a derivative was predicated on fraud makes even the benefits of her use as a derivative a potential liability due to the mischaracterization of risk associated with her performance in any portfolios. 

…

 

“The Petitioner also contends that the Texas Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to rule on a waiver of Sovereign Immunity for the appropriately named respondents per Wasson Interests v. City of Jacksonville, 14-0645, Texas Supreme Court, April 1, 2016 concerning breach of contract by misrepresenting risk factors in exercising authority in making decisions regarding publicly financed entities.

...

 

“Argument  

“When one takes into consideration that Crouse was able to trace how she was used as a derivative for a uranium company based on a fraudulent insurance designation then one is compelled to consider how this is potentially connected to other forms of financial fraud— including other types of insurance fraud—that avail themselves of the use of derivatives. A single derivative can be used for more than one sector at a time with different and varying associated risk factors. As such, the one fraud can become a manifold fraud. That Crouse was used as a derivative for a high-risk sector such as uranium trade brings into consideration the implications of fraud connected to insurance associated with coverage for industries impacted by acts of terrorism, such as the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program. Indeed, several of the companies that Crouse recorded as being the parent class of the asset designations at the Bridge Over Troubled Waters have contracts in foreign conflict zones where acts of terrorism that would be covered by TRIP are not beyond consideration and in fact may already have been paid out in the time since Crouse left.

...

 

“The $5 billion award from the Housing and Urban Development Agency is fraud against the People of Texas insofar as the use of people as derivative instruments in public financing risk portfolios has not been addressed as it would have been had the HPD, MHMRA and others not colluded in obstructing reports of child abuse at a domestic violence shelter.

…

 

“An accurate reporting on law enforcement adherence to required certification procedures [including in consideration of anti-trafficking laws] would also impact insurance rates and risk assessments of attendant public or municipal financing portfolios. 

…

 

“Additionally, as 17-0622 pointed out on Aug. 3, 2017, residents of Harris County had been given merely 10 days before they had to respond to changes required by the Harris County Comptroller regarding an up to 20 percent increase in rates for delinquent property taxes to take affect within 30 days. Following the declaration of State of Emergency in Houston and Harris County, however, Mayor Sylvester Turner and the Office of the Harris County Comptroller Annette Bennett declared a freeze on all property taxes for six months pending a re-assessment of property values. Such designations give homeowners different risk factors and deleteriously impact property values in the event of needing to sell their houses quickly, procure independent financing to assist with meeting the requirements of the flood mitigation plan upgrades, or assessments for property values connected to levying of property taxes. They also impact information and figures used to assess financing for local ISDs. The question needs to be asked if this is intentionally designed to likewise place public schools under the purview of the Department of Homeland Security to be used as derivative financial  instruments with increased associated risk factors.

…

 

“According to Justice Brown’s opinion in Wasson Interests v. City of Jacksonville, the Sovereign Immunity for a municipality can extend no farther than the State’s. As such, actions permitted by municipal officials also reflect on the State. When evaluated from this perspective, then the “risks” associated with obstructing appropriate reporting on abuses of the civil and Constitutional rights of the People of Texas—including and especially children—become more poignant. Using immigrant children as competing financial instruments with child citizens of Texas is an abuse of civil and Constitutional rights as well as breach of contract by the State of Texas with the People of Texas.

…

 

“Additionally, just as a single derivative can be used for multiple accounts with varying risk assessed to each, so too can “parent/child” account designations entail varying risk values. That the U.S. military command structure also uses “parent/child” command designations and that the move to classify so much public financing debt obligation as emergency assistance that would place recipients of recovery under the purview of the Department of Homeland Security calls into question the distinction between civilian and military sectors in U.S. society. 

…

 

“The failure to address child abuse at a domestic violence shelter in the form of using children as derivative financial instruments classified as assets by funders–or their competitors—has thusfar failed to assure safeguards against the institutionalization of child abuse by using children as derivatives in increased risk scenarios. Additionally, the U.S. Constitution prohibits the forced “quartering of soldiers;” how would using children or others as derivatives in military scenarios impact their ability to obtain assistance otherwise (Amendment III, “Bill of Rights,” U.S. Constitution)? That these “child commands” are being held in facilities still classified as assets by the DOD leaves open the possibility that they can be used as military assets via derivative. This is against International Law and is completely Un-American. 

…

 

“That specific classifications of relations to people from “Muslim” countries should be permitted but others would not be compels the question of motive in selection of country and designation of accepted relational assignment. Legal refutations to the ban that seek to justify lifting it based on an inventory of assets available to one without the relational prohibition—such as is demonstrated in Hawaii v. Trump—are evidence of this very point. The matter then becomes not so much one of national security as one of financial advantage and controlling associated risks. In essence, high-risk Muslim assets will be permitted to do business in the U.S. but the U.S. absolves itself of responsibility for specific risk classifications for which it would otherwise be responsible. If this is the case, then this would be a violation of the Texas Constitution (Sec. 7, “Bill of Rights,” Texas Constitution). This also begs an examination of what high-risk businesses in the countries from which people were banned was being conducted during the early stages of the ban to determine if there was an intentional effort to prevent legitimate business associates from  those countries from being able to access resources from the U.S. in order to give an undue competitive advantage to others who were not from that country.”

 

-- From In re Charity Colleen Crouse petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, 18-0600, Supreme Court of Texas, June 29, 2018.

 

________________________________________________________

 

From 235.006 Contracting methods and contract type (Part 235 -- Research and Development Contracting) Department of Defense Federal Acquisitions Regulation

…

1. Do not award a fixed-price type contract for a development program unless--

(1) The level of program risk permits realistic pricing;

(2) The use of a fixed-priced type contract permits an equitable and sensible allocation of program risk between the Government and the contractor; and

(3) A written determination that the criteria of paragraphs (b) (ii) (A) (1) and (2) of this section have been met is executed…

 

I contend that these terms have not been met under any circumstances. For one, there has been a protracted period of time in refusing to correct for mischaracterization of what documentation HAS been used. Secondly, even insofar as a derivative reporting could potentially allow for some form of “substitute compliance” then it is more than obvious that the substitution has failed to meet the basic requirements regarding compliance within the terms of the specifications that would be necessary for qualification in said domain. Third, even if it were to be accounted for such that the mischaracterization reflected a form of liability available for leveraging, the refusal to address the explicit terms of the parameters for consideration has permitted for inappropriate consideration of available methods for evaluation, as well as persons of concern.  

 

Public reporting, as is mandated in consideration of contract bid processes as well as awards, also entails a responsibility in terms of acquisition of source materials. In the production determinants provided in the process outlined as part of the inception of the Wartime Production Act, among the matters of concern in determining whether or not to permit for something that has been developed to be shipped out are the considerations on the licensing and certification of the items after they have been approved upon final inspection. Without such available, then authentication of the item after it is “packaged” and then permitted to be removed from the site in order to be shipped elsewhere has not been provided. This could additionally provide unsafe handling in not authenticating the risks associated with shipping or opening the “package” upon arrival. It was at this specific step in the “inspection report” that I composed in early 2020 that was when I would have refused to allow for whatever the “product” was that was alleged to be ready for distribution to be sent out. That “inspection report” was stolen from my room along with a personal identification document before the end of February of 2020. The refusal of any law enforcement or regulatory agency to intercede for years prior to that and the subsequent refusal of any law enforcement or regulatory agency to intercede since has continued for the original risks that were mischaracterized to accrue in manners that are completely unsustainable.

 

In this case, the contractor has been unwilling to assume responsibility for the accumulated risks, as has been demonstrated for a protracted period of time. That the “default” then falls onto the government brings into consideration a substantial challenge in regards to the means by which the material that was acquired and used in the research and development processes was acquired. That also includes intangible property associated with using efforts for individuals to meet their resource needs as “research” connected to product development, including product development that may have a dual civilian and/or military use. In the event of a CBRN incident, the protocols for a domestic incident that were in place prior to the formal declaration of an emergency situation regarding COVID-19 and even before the time in which it was reported that COVID-19 was first reported elsewhere, certain processes would have “triggered” a risk consideration that would have required cooperation between the military and the civilian health and security infrastructure in order to maintain the outbreak risk as well as to assure against exploitation in order to promulgate another national security or international security incident. I contend that refusing to accurately reflect the national security concerns associated with COVID-19 as a form of CBRN-qualified concern has allowed for an increased risk that is evidence of willful fraud and other crimes with the aim of intentionally increasing risks associated with these concerns beyond a point that can be contained. I also contend that the material foundations for such to be able to proliferate were much earlier than the declaration of COVID-19 as is attested to in 18-0600, as well as even prior to that in regards to reports submitted in Texas but after attempting to seek assistance in reporting events from and in Illinois beginning in March of 2016.

 

If human services should be permitted to be contracted to DoD contractors, either domestically or abroad, or the contract acquisition processes for DoD contractors should permit for processes of risk leveraging that are so substantially unsustainable to occur, then not only is it that their protections from prosecution that should be contested, but that considerations of secrecy or confidentiality of proprietary information regarding the corporate persons needs to be considered relative to the risks those protections present to other persons, including individual persons who are subjected to speculation on DoD contracting without their consent or even without their knowledge. The burden is on the contracting party, and insofar as any service that is engaged in using DoD contracting ALSO receives federal appropriations without being subjected to DoD contracting requirements, then the consideration of the level of risk that the government agrees to take on needs to likewise be considered, including insofar as burden of proof of sustainability or legitimization is concerned. The government, like the contractor, must be able to prove that the risk is “sensible” and “equitably” allocated. In this case it is not.

 

The “demonstration” shows that there would LITERALLY have been delivered into the hands of what is at this point allowed to be declared as a nation under sanctions for national security reasons “products” that would be treasonable to allow for them to obtain. Additionally, the sequencing on this sort of bidding process has posited the “prosecution” on the refusal to distribute “stock options” that are based upon an earlier criminal conviction for trafficking minors IN THE COURSE OF TRAFFICKING MORE MINORS. Refusing to prosecute trafficking for trafficking and on the level that it is occurring, and to instead allow for the sort of risk assessments in regards to other characterizations of such crimes as opposed to accurately identifying and prosecuting them AS trafficking, has permitted for the accrual of unsustainable risk, even at the level that presumably such “risk” was thus far allowed to be legitimized.

 

Is using minors in processes of research and development in the course of DoD contract bidding “trafficking?” At what point do R&D processes regarding DoD contract awards take into account the risks associated with the research and development process’ long-terrm impact on the welfare of those who are used as subjects? Is using adults who are under the assumption that they are being provided with some service or are being engaged in acquiring a non-defense-related resource as R&D for processes regarding DoD contract awards “trafficking?” In this sequence, the refusal to address crime AS crime on the levels it is at while instead attempting to “leverage” offsets of prosecution of crime has only created incentives to increase the crime risk associated with the processes. The burden is on those who set out to gain from the highest level of risk engagement and correlated their processes accordingly to have priority in accessing the benefits of accrued risk credit due to the manners in which other levels of risk are addressed. I contend that means that ultimately, the burden falls on the contractor and the government when it comes to government acquisitions in regards to DoD contracting.   

 

For the record: At this time, I personally have no personal identification documents and am locked out of my domicile wherein my business office is located. I am using a public library in front of the “young adult” section. This is completely inappropriate for these sorts of considerations. I specifically showed a print out of 18-0600 as part of an appeal to the person of concern who looked at it and asked questions. I explicitly stated that it has to do with trafficking people in connection with contract bidding that also involved potential national security concerns and abuse of derivatives. I contend ti is a national security concern to violate the civil and constitutional rights of citizens and to engage in fraudulent practices for acquiring materials from otherwise law-abiding citizens insofar as it attempts to compel, corse, or extort them into agreeing to commit crimes against their own country or aid and comfort the enemy.

 

In this matter, even the legitimacy of the national security functions of the state are called into question as the acquisition of the materials posited a false assumption that the person who had access to securing documentation and evidence that was meant to be used to prosecute crime was mischaracterized as the threat and defrauded while being stolen from and attempted for extortion into agreeing to conspire to commit other crimes. In the course of this, those items were NOT used to “secure” but rather to attempt further coercion and increase the risks associated with the scheme.

 

The conclusions for the failure of any “sensible” and “equitable” consideration--much less provision of basic safety, including in this case housing, food, clothing, and secure communications along with appropriate persons with whom to correspond and organize--leaves no other conclusion than that the government has been infiltrated in manners that jeopardize national security, intend to prioritize foreign interests over and above the interests of the People of the United States, and create as enemies what would otherwise be needed as strategic allies in the event of escalation or war. 

 

If the government will not honor its contract with the People that is the Constitution and instead will allow for “contracts” with “contractors” who contract to commit crime to promulgate instead, then they have lost their authority to contract on behalf of the People. None of these contracts is binding.

 

4:11 pm CST

Nov. 6, 2021

 

Here’s the problem...what if we ARE going to war, and a traitor is in MY house while the entire government knows and just makes excuses for reasons that have no “sensible” justification and no “equitable” consideration -- like “equal treatment under the law?”

 

Can I “acquire” and “contract” for my own weapons paradigm?

 

Can I “steal” Sam’s trust and bhis sister’s house and his brother’s bar card?

 

What about Holt’s truck?

 

What about Will’s license?

 

What about Tobias black book?

 

What about Gus’ office?

 

See...I don’t need to. I should not have been subverted by traitors. I have my own already, so get the traitors out of my house and in jail so the people they stole from WHILE THEY STOLE FROM me can finally get restitution.