In the Mobil case, one of the primary factors involves the judge’s effort to characterize the plaintiff based on his purported literacy, education, and ability to read and understand the contract. The judge alleges that because he did not read it, then arguments concerning conscionability – whether substantive or procedural – are subsidiary to other factors. He then proceeds to cite a number of other cases, involving claimants with significant educational background and unchallenged professional experience – which serves as a demonstration of a sort of “pumping” up of the value of a stock basis on such an agreement (“market value” of person providing services at time of contract) only to dismiss the case in this matter – effectively “dumping” it after costs associated with the effort, for which the plaintiff is now liable – have been increased. 

 

On the other hand, the fact that said plaintiff had three years experience working at a gas station – which in the case does not state any qualms were expressed about his ability to know requirements for receiving products, stocking products, or selling products – and then was approached by a sales representative from a competitor are not thoroughly considered. This occurs concurrent to an explication by the judge of the role of consideration – including disclosure and confirmation of a “meeting of the minds” – by both the plaintiff and the respondent. That the company relies on the primary sales representative as the primary justification for its defense and not on who allowed for gasoline that would not meet a standard of reasonableness for an experienced person in a gas station to accept delivery on is not discussed. While it identifies that the plaintiff did not read the contract, it does not discuss if the sales representative disclosed that the gasoline that was expected for delivery was something that would not meet legal requirements for sale at a gas station. If the sales representative offered substandard product, then even if the plaintiff agreed, the consideration becomes how the sales representative came to have to offer substandard products to contract with another to take delivery on. 

 

Who at Exxon* authorized the sales representative to offer illegal products for such a market? This is important because of the allegations that the “contract was destroyed by fire” and the rest of the inventory – including products not provided by Mobil – were destroyed. In essence, the “cost” of taking delivery on this “product” was NOT just gasoline with water in it, but the attendant costs resulting from the efforts of taking delivery of a hazardous material that did not meet legal safety requirements. This is ALSO demonstrated by the judge in his characterizations of the requisite claimants when considering what the judge claims are comparable claims.

 

If the plaintiff agreed to take delivery of gasoline with water in it then that was a crime, not a tort. If someone else at Mobil agreed to a take on a contractee for ANY reason not about what would otherwise be LEGAL – including appropriate waste disposal or a return on being attempted for delivery to Mobil by someone who was supplying gasoline with water in it under the auspices that it was gasoline that met legal standards for gasoline for market – then that is a crime, not a tort. A gasoline station owner should know as surely as a lawyer in the gas and oil sector that such delivery was a crime, not a tort. 

 

From Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp. 415 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Mich. 1976)

March 15, 2022

Before 3:40 pm CST

 

 Composed in electronic form at 5:39 pm CST

March 15, 2022

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Posted 5:51 pm CST

March 15, 2022

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