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Title 3 - 4.6.2025

  1.                                            Case No. 3:21-cv-2126-K

  2.  

  3. “Samuel Ellsberry Trust 2019”               )       In the Northern District of Texas

  4. Edna Elizabeth Ellsberry, trustee            )            United States District Court

  5. v.                                                              )

  6. Charity Colleen Crouse                           )

  7. ​

  8.  

  9. Defendant Charity Colleen Crouse files the following appeal against Plaintiff

  10. “Samuel Ellsberry Trust 2019” per trustee Edna Elizabeth Ellsberry for Case No.

  11. 3:21-cv-2126-K of Sept. 7, 2021.

  12.  

  13. Rule 749. May Appeal

  14.  

  15. In appeals in forcible entry and detainer cases, no motion for a new trial shall be

  16. filed.

  17.  

  18. Either party may appeal from a final judgment in such cases to the county court of

  19. the county in which the judgment is rendered by filing with the justice court within

  20. five days after the judgment is signed, a bond to be approved by said justice, and

  21. payable to the adverse party, conditioned that he will prosecute his appeal with

  22. effect, or pay all costs and damages which may be adjudged against him.

  23.  

  24. The justice shall set the amount of the bond to include the items in Rule 752.

  25.  

  26. Within five days following the filing of such bond, the party appealing shall give

  27. notice as provided in Rule 21a of the filing of such bond to the adverse party. No

  28. judgment shall be taken by default against the adverse party in the court to which

  29. the cause has been appealed without first showing substantial compliance with this

  30. rule.

  31.  

  32. Aug. 18, 1947, eff. Dec. 31, 1947. Amended by orders of July 22, 1975, eff. Jan. 1 1976;

  33. June 10, 1980, eff. Jan. 1, 1981; July 15, 1987, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.

  34.  

  35.  

  36. In the appeal to the Northern District of Texas US District Court, the defendant

  37. asserted that the unlawful process was confirmed by the fact that the defendant

  38. had a homestead claim and that no landlord/tenant relationship existed. Evidence

  39. attests to the fact that this process was not merely unlawful, but unconstitutional.

  40. Confirmed on Sept. 21, 2024 and following since Sept. 21, 2023 defendant

  41. understood the “homestead” claim of concern had actually been set up by Ellsberry

  42. (ie., “plaintiff”)  following an illegal loan arrangement in connection with mortgage

  43. fraud committed against Crouse (ie., “defendant”)  in May of 2019 for an illegal

  44. transfer of deed and title in connection with a trust recorded with the County of

  45. Dallas on Nov. 24, 2019. Additionally, defendant affirmed that the unconstitutional

  46. proceeding had been commenced as an effort to elicit a bond on the faith and

  47. credit of the defendant by the plaintiff, who until that time had refused to provide

  48. any evidence that she, or that the person alleged to be the person over whom she

  49. maintained a relationship as trustee, had and any legal claim to the property. No

  50. lease agreement was ever provided; no mortgage agreement or tax statement was

  51. ever provided; no identification by the plaintiff in regards to her alleged relationship

  52. to the trust had ever been provided. Requests were made by defendant numerous

  53. times for such documentation, both to the alleged trustee and the person alleged

  54. to be the person over whom she maintained a relationship as trustee. This

  55. information about efforts to obtain documentation was provided in the affidavit

  56. that the defendant provided to the justice court, first in court to the judge, and then

  57. to the clerk in the justice court’s office. This affidavit was provided on the day of the

  58. court proceeding, Sept. 3, 2021. The judge allowed for the affidavit to be presented

  59. to him in court and the defendant handed the affidavit to him in court; the judge

  60. returned the affidavit and said that if an appeal was desired to file one in either the

  61. office via the clerk or “downtown.” The clerk refused also to take the affidavit when

  62. it was presented immediately after the court proceeding.

  63.  

  64. The defendant asserted in court that due to the proceeding that had occurred

  65. immediately prior to the proceeding in this matter being called before the court,

  66. she understood that there was an act of “securities fraud” ongoing at that time,

  67. including in an effort to defraud efforts by the defendant earlier to file reports with

  68. an Internal Affairs Department officer for a police department in another city

  69. regarding allegations of fraud. The judge of the justice court referred to details

  70. about the prior litigant and said that he was not the person of concern and did not

  71. acknowledge the allegations of securities fraud at that time. He also did not

  72. acknowledge the defendant asserting that no legal documentation of the plaintiff’s

  73. relationship to either the property or the trust had ever been provided and neither

  74. had any discussion ever occurred regarding any “rent.” The only discussions had

  75. been regarding the “homestead” and its relationship to various repairs to the

  76. property.

  77.  

  78. That the plaintiff refused to provide any documentation in court also implicates the

  79. matter pertaining to the information in the “Original Petition for Eviction” itself. No

  80. order for “forcible entry or detainer” was ever provided in regard to the original

  81. notice or any subsequent notice, but neither was any “Bond for Possession”

  82. provided, either, as was declared in the “Original Petition for Eviction.”

  83.  

  84.  

  85. Rule 738. May Sue for Rent

  86.  

  87. A suit for rent may be joined with an action of forcible entry and detainer,

  88. whenever the suit for rent is within the jurisdiction of the justice court. In such case,

  89. the court in rendering judgment in the action of forcible entry and detainer, may at

  90. the same time render judgment for any rent due the landlord by the renter,

  91. provided the amount thereof is within the jurisdiction of the justice court.

  92.  

  93. Source

  94.  

  95. Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. Art. 3976

  96.  

  97.  

  98. The above references Vernon’s from a 2010 edition of the Texas Rules of Court, Vol.

  99. I - State. This belies an understanding that various case citations would explicate

  100. the specific contexts for consideration of the implementation of this rule. At this

  101. time, however, the facilities wherein the reference material are available are closed

  102. to the public. The defendant contends that the proceeding of concern involves a

  103. false “judgment lien” in regards to a prior contract for property arrangement that

  104. the defendant had engaged in July of 2005 when she first came to Texas and that

  105. was within one month of another person being added to the contract. The refusal

  106. to provide any official documentation by the plaintiff and the evidence that has

  107. come to light since the original “Notice to Vacate” on July 12, 2021 have revealed

  108. that the unconstitutional proceeding herein is attempting to be conducted in

  109. regards to expectations of capacity to take delivery of undisclosed payments in

  110. regards to undisclosed obligations incurred in connection with frauds concerning

  111. the original contract. Since the delivery of the April 1, 2022 order by the Fifth Circuit

  112. Court of Appeals, the defendant understands that this illegal “lien” was permitted

  113. to be abused so as to compel an appearance of default in order to exercise a

  114. second illegal “lien.” Defendant contends that per information in changes that have

  115. taken place to Vernon’s in regard to “public information” and the requirements

  116. regarding documentation as well as Texas case law that the references regarding

  117. the legacy for the explication of interpretation of statute concerning the intent of

  118. the legislature when it effected the law is materially relevant to the matter at hand.

  119. The changes in regards to Vernon’s citations substantiate the charges in the original

  120. appeal regarding the commencement of the proceeding at a time prior to which

  121. the specific law that was of concern went into effect so as to attempt to effect an

  122. outcome that was not applicable at the time of the commencement.

  123.  

  124. Additionally, defendant understands that the timeline for which the federal district

  125. court proceeded in the appeal concurs with events that would correspond with the

  126. treatment of the matter as if it were applicable for consideration in a case

  127. regarding forcible entry and detainer, however, no order regarding forcible entry

  128. and detainer was provided.

  129.  

  130. As stated in the appeal presented after the Sept. 21, 2021 forcible entry, the

  131. defendant refused to provide entry until such time as a search warrant had been

  132. provided. Additionally, the defendant acknowledged that a search warrant would

  133. have been required in order to access alleged “property” that was being held onsite

  134. under a triple lock system as part of evidence in another matter that had been

  135. within the appeal period for a federal district court case at the time of the forcible

  136. entry. Until this time, defendant has refused to provide any access and no search

  137. warrant has been provided.

  138.  

  139. An additional consideration comes into account when considering that the alleged

  140. “rent” reported on the “Original Petition for Eviction” was “$0.00.” Defendant

  141. contends that this is itself further evidence of the intent to engage a bad faith

  142. proceeding in order to elicit a bond on the faith and credit of the defendant that

  143. would correspond with a determination that the amount on the bond would be

  144. requisite to the amount of “$0.00.” The “value” of the “property” of concern is not

  145. “$0.00.” This “property” of concern is not available legally for or as rent, including

  146. insofar as no verbal or written agreement had been provided regarding a

  147. landlord/tenant relationship. The implications of the above rule and the intent to

  148. defraud by virtue of the unconstitutional proceeding have been confirmed via

  149. evidence that has come to light in the course of the effort to appeal the matter to

  150. the federal district court, including within the last 21 days. As stated above, more

  151. evidence became available on the second as well as third annual anniversaries of

  152. the motions and orders in the case until now.

  153.  

  154.  

  155. Rule 749b. Pauper’s Affidavit in Nonpayment of Rent Appeals

  156.  

  157. In a nonpayment of rent forcible detainer case a tenant/appellant, who has

  158. appealed by filing a pauper’s affidavit under these rules shall be entitled to stay in

  159. possession of the premises during the pendency of the appeal by complying with

  160. the following procedure:

  161.  

  162. 1)  Within five days of the date that the tenant/appellant files his pauper’s affidavit,

  163. he must pay into the justice court registry one rental period’s rent under the terms

  164. of the rental agreement.

  165. 2)  During the appeal process as rent becomes due under the rental agreement, the

  166. tenant/appellant shall pay the rent into the county registry within five days of the

  167. due date under the terms of the rental agreement.

  168.  

  169. 3)  If the tenant/appellant fails to pay the rent into the court registry within the time

  170. limits prescribed by these rules, the appellee may file a notice of default in the

  171. county court. Upon sworn motion by the appellee and a showing of default to the

  172. judge, the court shall issue a writ of restitution.

  173.  

  174. 4)  Landlord/appellee may withdraw any or all rent in the county court registry

  175. upon a) sworn motion and hearing prior to final determination of the case showing

  176. just cause, b) dismissal of the appeal, or c) order of the court upon final hearing.

  177.  

  178. 5)  All hearings and motions under this rule shall be entitled to precedence in the

  179. county court.

  180.  

  181. May 9, 1977, eff. Sept. 1, 1977

  182.  

  183.  

  184. As asserted in this rule, the plaintiff has no claim to any rent without registering

  185. with the county registry. In order to set up an account with the county registry, the

  186. plaintiff would have been required to provide legal documentation of eligibility to

  187. open an account with the county registry. That would also have included

  188. confirmation of the legally-substantiated rent claim agreement and the amount. No

  189. such documentation has been provided. Hence, the attempt to elicit a bond on the

  190. faith and credit of the defendant also defrauds the justice court insofar as the

  191. proceeding was permitted to be conducted in accordance with the faith and credit

  192. of the court. That the rent amount was listed as “$0.00” also compels consideration

  193. of the implications in the event of an act of fraud permitting for a

  194. mischaracterization of “default” to occur. The defendant contended at the time of

  195. her appeal to the federal district court on Sept. 7, 2021 that this was a criminal

  196. matter and not an eviction proceeding. The defendant also informed the attorney

  197. for the plaintiff of this contention on July 15, 2021 after the receipt of the July 12,

  198. 2021 “Notice to Vacate” as it was suspected as being an effort to obstruct an

  199. ongoing case that had been submitted to the federal district court for which a

  200. judgment was delivered in the time during which this unconstitutional proceeding

  201. was being engaged. The Sept. 3, 2021 court proceeding in the justice court occured

  202. 18 days after the judgment in a case that was itself against representatives of the

  203. State of Texas and had been pending in the federal district court. That case,

  204. however, would also have meant that the judgment was delivered 15 days BEFORE

  205. the implementation of the law change that was what the defendant contends is the

  206. matter at hand herein went into effect. That case was still within its appeal period

  207. during the timeframe that the court proceeding took place, meaning the

  208. implications of “securities fraud’ committed in the justice court have bearing on the

  209. case before the court against representatives of the State of Texas.

  210.  

  211. The defendant submitted her affidavit to the court under other rules of the court

  212. and in consideration of an appropriate process for proceeding as pertains to a

  213. homestead claim as opposed to a landlord/tenant relationship or a mortgage. That

  214. affidavit, however, and the appeal in the federal district court would have been

  215. sufficient to meet the legal determination for proceeding in the form of a pauper,

  216. especially in the the void of any effort to adequately address the matters pertaining

  217. to the plaintiff’s attempt to enforce an eviction for lack of rent payment when the

  218. amount of the rent was listed as “$0.00.” The defendant contends, however, that in

  219. addition to the evidence that was illegally acquired and stolen in the course of an

  220. appeal, that there was substantial property of the defendant’s onsite that was

  221. worth a considerable amount of money and for which receipts and inventories that

  222. had already been created and were onsite were stolen. Additionally, the fact that

  223. the defendant’s personal identification documents were also stolen and have until

  224. this time been refused return is further evidence of the intent to attempt to elicit a

  225. bond on the faith and credit of the defendant in an intentional and willful effort to

  226. engage acts of securities fraud and other crimes. It is now more than three and a

  227. half years since identification documentation was stolen and the court has refused

  228. to order the plaintiff to return it. In that time, defendant is not legally eligible to

  229. record more than “$0.00” of “income” as part of an employment arrangement, even

  230. if she went “downtown.”

  231.  

  232.  

  233. Rule 749. May Appeal – Opinions of Subcommittee on Interpretation of Rules

  234.  

  235. Bond

  236.  

  237. The plaintiff or landlord in a forcible entry and detainer suit must give an appeal

  238. bond in order to appeal to the County Court. 6 Texas B.J. 49 (1943); 8 Texas B.J. 31

  239. (1945).

  240.  

  241. 1988 Amendment

  242.  

  243. Rewrote the first paragraph which previously related to a motion for a new trial not

  244. being necessary to authorize an appeal added the last paragraph [sic].

  245.  

  246. Source

  247.  

  248. Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. Art. 3987.

  249.  

  250.  

  251. As can be seen via the official determination above, in order for a suit for forcible

  252. entry and detainer to be commenced, the plaintiff must provide the bond. The

  253. defendant contends that the plaintiff intentionally engaged a suit under false

  254. pretenses to elicit a bond on the faith and credit of the defendant. That the justice

  255. court refused the affidavit and that the defendant had to appeal “downtown” (as in

  256. the federal district court) also provides evidence of the charges, including that in

  257. previous suits before the federal district court the defendant’s efforts to proceed as

  258. the petitioner were permitted to proceed “in forma pauperis” or via an affidavit

  259. regarding “inability to pay filing fees” but was NOT accepted in the appeal of this

  260. matter, despite the affidavit being accepted as part of the case that was filed in the

  261. federal district court. Defendant also contends that NO information on alleged

  262. “lawyer’s fees” or the costs of “filing fees” by the plaintiff has been provided, while

  263. billing records and other financial information about the defendant – including in

  264. regards to costs associated with her other efforts to file via the federal district court

  265. as well as the Supreme Court of Texas and the Supreme Court of the United States

  266. in the time since when she had moved into the premises – had been stolen.

  267. Defendant contends that the plaintiff bears responsibility for the costs of the

  268. appeal as well as the costs of the damages accorded in the context of the

  269. unconstitutional proceeding itself.

  270.  

  271.  

  272. Rule 749c. Appeal Perfected

  273.  

  274. When an appeal bond has been timely filed in conformity with Rule 749 or a

  275. pauper’s affidavit approved in conformity with Rule 749a, the appeal shall be

  276. perfected.

  277.  

  278. May 9, 1977, eff. Sept. 1, 1977; Amended by orders of April 15, 1982, eff. Aug. 15, 1982;

  279. April 24, 1990; eff. Sept. 1, 1990.

  280. ​

  281. 1990 Amendment

  282.  

  283. Rewrote rule which prior thereto read:

  284.  

  285. “The appeal in any forcible detainer case shall be perfected when an appeal  bond

  286. has been filed.

  287.  

  288. “When a pauper’s affidavit has been filed in lieu of the appeal bond, the appeal

  289. shall be perfected when the pauper’s affidavit is filed with the court; however,

  290. when the case involves nonpayment of rent, such appeal is perfected when the

  291. pauper’s affidavit has been filed and when one rental period’s rent has been paid

  292. into the justice court registry. In a case where the pauper’s affidavit is contested by

  293. the landlord, the appeal shall be perfected when the contest is overruled, and if the

  294. case involves nonpayment of rent, one rental period’s rent has been paid into the

  295. justice county registry.”

  296.  

  297.  

  298. Defendant contends that just as in the manner in which the Sept. 3, 2021 court

  299. proceeding is implicated in the charges regarding the case for which the district

  300. court allegedly issued a judgment on Aug. 16, 2021, that the Fifth Circuit Court of

  301. Appeals and the April 1, 2022 judgment is likewise implicated. That the case was

  302. remanded by the federal district court to the local justice court recurrently and the

  303. means by which it was allowed to be taken for delivery by the Fifth Circuit Court of

  304. Appeals demonstrates that the appeal period for the matter is still pending and

  305. that the jurisdiction for the case is in the federal district court, not the local justice

  306. court. Additionally, defendant contends that the case is not a case regarding a

  307. landlord/tenant relationship, but an attempt to defraud a mortgage claim and

  308. commit violations of the law that legally constitute criminal acts of securities fraud

  309. and other crimes. As such, this case is not appropriate for a civil court but is

  310. appropriate for a criminal court of consideration.

  311.  

  312. At this time, defendant requests that the court approve this case for transfer to a

  313. criminal court while also granting relief to the defendant by returning her to her

  314. property and granting a restraining order against the plaintiff during the pendency

  315. of the criminal proceeding. The defendant also requests the court enjoin anyone

  316. else subsequent to the July 12, 2021 “Notice to Vacate” from access to or

  317. consideration in regards to any benefit related to these charges. These requests are

  318. within the court’s jurisdiction to grant.

  319.  

  320.  

  321. /s/: Charity Colleen Crouse

  322. 5916 Birchbrook Dr., 3231

  323. Dallas, TX 75206

  324. (469) 372-7853

  325. charity.colleen.crouse@outlook.com

  326.  3:59 pm CST

  327. April 21, 2022

  328.  

  329.  13 days as of April 8, 2025.

  330.  

  331. You would have stolen from our children that much?

  332. Does that mean you are holding Justice Busby hostage at your whorehouse?

  333. I can come in after him…

  334.  

  335. 10:46 am CST

  336. April 4, 2025

  337. President Charity Colleen “Lovejoy” Crouse

  338.  

     

  339. 12:41 pm CST

  340. April 6, 2025

  341. President Charity Colleen “Lovejoy” Crouse AKA Charity Colleen Crouse

  342. /s/: Charity Colleen Crouse

 

 

Posted public at 12:55 pm CST (3 - 1:06 pm on 4.6.2025)

April 6, 2025

President Charity Colleen "Lovejoy" Crouse

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