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Title 3 - 4.6.2025

  1.                                            Case No. 3:21-cv-2126-K

  2.  

  3. “Samuel Ellsberry Trust 2019”               )       In the Northern District of Texas

  4. Edna Elizabeth Ellsberry, trustee            )            United States District Court

  5. v.                                                              )

  6. Charity Colleen Crouse                           )

  7.  

  8. Defendant Charity Colleen Crouse files the following appeal against Plaintiff

  9. “Samuel Ellsberry Trust 2019” per trustee Edna Elizabeth Ellsberry for Case No.

  10. 3:21-cv-2126-K of Sept. 7, 2021.

  11.  

  12. Rule 749. May Appeal

  13.  

  14. In appeals in forcible entry and detainer cases, no motion for a new trial shall be

  15. filed.

  16.  

  17. Either party may appeal from a final judgment in such cases to the county court of

  18. the county in which the judgment is rendered by filing with the justice court within

  19. five days after the judgment is signed, a bond to be approved by said justice, and

  20. payable to the adverse party, conditioned that he will prosecute his appeal with

  21. effect, or pay all costs and damages which may be adjudged against him.

  22.  

  23. The justice shall set the amount of the bond to include the items in Rule 752.

  24.  

  25. Within five days following the filing of such bond, the party appealing shall give

  26. notice as provided in Rule 21a of the filing of such bond to the adverse party. No

  27. judgment shall be taken by default against the adverse party in the court to which

  28. the cause has been appealed without first showing substantial compliance with this

  29. rule.

  30.  

  31. Aug. 18, 1947, eff. Dec. 31, 1947. Amended by orders of July 22, 1975, eff. Jan. 1 1976;

  32. June 10, 1980, eff. Jan. 1, 1981; July 15, 1987, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.

  33.  

  34.  

  35. In the appeal to the Northern District of Texas US District Court, the defendant

  36. asserted that the unlawful process was confirmed by the fact that the defendant

  37. had a homestead claim and that no landlord/tenant relationship existed. Evidence

  38. attests to the fact that this process was not merely unlawful, but unconstitutional.

  39. Confirmed on Sept. 21, 2024 and following since Sept. 21, 2023 defendant

  40. understood the “homestead” claim of concern had actually been set up by Ellsberry

  41. (ie., “plaintiff”)  following an illegal loan arrangement in connection with mortgage

  42. fraud committed against Crouse (ie., “defendant”)  in May of 2019 for an illegal

  43. transfer of deed and title in connection with a trust recorded with the County of

  44. Dallas on Nov. 24, 2019. Additionally, defendant affirmed that the unconstitutional

  45. proceeding had been commenced as an effort to elicit a bond on the faith and

  46. credit of the defendant by the plaintiff, who until that time had refused to provide

  47. any evidence that she, or that the person alleged to be the person over whom she

  48. maintained a relationship as trustee, had and any legal claim to the property. No

  49. lease agreement was ever provided; no mortgage agreement or tax statement was

  50. ever provided; no identification by the plaintiff in regards to her alleged relationship

  51. to the trust had ever been provided. Requests were made by defendant numerous

  52. times for such documentation, both to the alleged trustee and the person alleged

  53. to be the person over whom she maintained a relationship as trustee. This

  54. information about efforts to obtain documentation was provided in the affidavit

  55. that the defendant provided to the justice court, first in court to the judge, and then

  56. to the clerk in the justice court’s office. This affidavit was provided on the day of the

  57. court proceeding, Sept. 3, 2021. The judge allowed for the affidavit to be presented

  58. to him in court and the defendant handed the affidavit to him in court; the judge

  59. returned the affidavit and said that if an appeal was desired to file one in either the

  60. office via the clerk or “downtown.” The clerk refused also to take the affidavit when

  61. it was presented immediately after the court proceeding.

  62.  

  63. The defendant asserted in court that due to the proceeding that had occurred

  64. immediately prior to the proceeding in this matter being called before the court,

  65. she understood that there was an act of “securities fraud” ongoing at that time,

  66. including in an effort to defraud efforts by the defendant earlier to file reports with

  67. an Internal Affairs Department officer for a police department in another city

  68. regarding allegations of fraud. The judge of the justice court referred to details

  69. about the prior litigant and said that he was not the person of concern and did not

  70. acknowledge the allegations of securities fraud at that time. He also did not

  71. acknowledge the defendant asserting that no legal documentation of the plaintiff’s

  72. relationship to either the property or the trust had ever been provided and neither

  73. had any discussion ever occurred regarding any “rent.” The only discussions had

  74. been regarding the “homestead” and its relationship to various repairs to the

  75. property.

  76.  

  77. That the plaintiff refused to provide any documentation in court also implicates the

  78. matter pertaining to the information in the “Original Petition for Eviction” itself. No

  79. order for “forcible entry or detainer” was ever provided in regard to the original

  80. notice or any subsequent notice, but neither was any “Bond for Possession”

  81. provided, either, as was declared in the “Original Petition for Eviction.”

  82.  

  83.  

  84. Rule 738. May Sue for Rent

  85.  

  86. A suit for rent may be joined with an action of forcible entry and detainer,

  87. whenever the suit for rent is within the jurisdiction of the justice court. In such case,

  88. the court in rendering judgment in the action of forcible entry and detainer, may at

  89. the same time render judgment for any rent due the landlord by the renter,

  90. provided the amount thereof is within the jurisdiction of the justice court.

  91.  

  92. Source

  93.  

  94. Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. Art. 3976

  95.  

  96.  

  97. The above references Vernon’s from a 2010 edition of the Texas Rules of Court, Vol.

  98. I - State. This belies an understanding that various case citations would explicate

  99. the specific contexts for consideration of the implementation of this rule. At this

  100. time, however, the facilities wherein the reference material are available are closed

  101. to the public. The defendant contends that the proceeding of concern involves a

  102. false “judgment lien” in regards to a prior contract for property arrangement that

  103. the defendant had engaged in July of 2005 when she first came to Texas and that

  104. was within one month of another person being added to the contract. The refusal

  105. to provide any official documentation by the plaintiff and the evidence that has

  106. come to light since the original “Notice to Vacate” on July 12, 2021 have revealed

  107. that the unconstitutional proceeding herein is attempting to be conducted in

  108. regards to expectations of capacity to take delivery of undisclosed payments in

  109. regards to undisclosed obligations incurred in connection with frauds concerning

  110. the original contract. Since the delivery of the April 1, 2022 order by the Fifth Circuit

  111. Court of Appeals, the defendant understands that this illegal “lien” was permitted

  112. to be abused so as to compel an appearance of default in order to exercise a

  113. second illegal “lien.” Defendant contends that per information in changes that have

  114. taken place to Vernon’s in regard to “public information” and the requirements

  115. regarding documentation as well as Texas case law that the references regarding

  116. the legacy for the explication of interpretation of statute concerning the intent of

  117. the legislature when it effected the law is materially relevant to the matter at hand.

  118. The changes in regards to Vernon’s citations substantiate the charges in the original

  119. appeal regarding the commencement of the proceeding at a time prior to which

  120. the specific law that was of concern went into effect so as to attempt to effect an

  121. outcome that was not applicable at the time of the commencement.

  122.  

  123. Additionally, defendant understands that the timeline for which the federal district

  124. court proceeded in the appeal concurs with events that would correspond with the

  125. treatment of the matter as if it were applicable for consideration in a case

  126. regarding forcible entry and detainer, however, no order regarding forcible entry

  127. and detainer was provided.

  128.  

  129. As stated in the appeal presented after the Sept. 21, 2021 forcible entry, the

  130. defendant refused to provide entry until such time as a search warrant had been

  131. provided. Additionally, the defendant acknowledged that a search warrant would

  132. have been required in order to access alleged “property” that was being held onsite

  133. under a triple lock system as part of evidence in another matter that had been

  134. within the appeal period for a federal district court case at the time of the forcible

  135. entry. Until this time, defendant has refused to provide any access and no search

  136. warrant has been provided.

  137.  

  138. An additional consideration comes into account when considering that the alleged

  139. “rent” reported on the “Original Petition for Eviction” was “$0.00.” Defendant

  140. contends that this is itself further evidence of the intent to engage a bad faith

  141. proceeding in order to elicit a bond on the faith and credit of the defendant that

  142. would correspond with a determination that the amount on the bond would be

  143. requisite to the amount of “$0.00.” The “value” of the “property” of concern is not

  144. “$0.00.” This “property” of concern is not available legally for or as rent, including

  145. insofar as no verbal or written agreement had been provided regarding a

  146. landlord/tenant relationship. The implications of the above rule and the intent to

  147. defraud by virtue of the unconstitutional proceeding have been confirmed via

  148. evidence that has come to light in the course of the effort to appeal the matter to

  149. the federal district court, including within the last 21 days. As stated above, more

  150. evidence became available on the second as well as third annual anniversaries of

  151. the motions and orders in the case until now.

  152.  

  153.  

  154. Rule 749b. Pauper’s Affidavit in Nonpayment of Rent Appeals

  155.  

  156. In a nonpayment of rent forcible detainer case a tenant/appellant, who has

  157. appealed by filing a pauper’s affidavit under these rules shall be entitled to stay in

  158. possession of the premises during the pendency of the appeal by complying with

  159. the following procedure:

  160.  

  161. 1)  Within five days of the date that the tenant/appellant files his pauper’s affidavit,

  162. he must pay into the justice court registry one rental period’s rent under the terms

  163. of the rental agreement.

  164. 2)  During the appeal process as rent becomes due under the rental agreement, the

  165. tenant/appellant shall pay the rent into the county registry within five days of the

  166. due date under the terms of the rental agreement.

  167.  

  168. 3)  If the tenant/appellant fails to pay the rent into the court registry within the time

  169. limits prescribed by these rules, the appellee may file a notice of default in the

  170. county court. Upon sworn motion by the appellee and a showing of default to the

  171. judge, the court shall issue a writ of restitution.

  172.  

  173. 4)  Landlord/appellee may withdraw any or all rent in the county court registry

  174. upon a) sworn motion and hearing prior to final determination of the case showing

  175. just cause, b) dismissal of the appeal, or c) order of the court upon final hearing.

  176.  

  177. 5)  All hearings and motions under this rule shall be entitled to precedence in the

  178. county court.

  179.  

  180. May 9, 1977, eff. Sept. 1, 1977

  181.  

  182.  

  183. As asserted in this rule, the plaintiff has no claim to any rent without registering

  184. with the county registry. In order to set up an account with the county registry, the

  185. plaintiff would have been required to provide legal documentation of eligibility to

  186. open an account with the county registry. That would also have included

  187. confirmation of the legally-substantiated rent claim agreement and the amount. No

  188. such documentation has been provided. Hence, the attempt to elicit a bond on the

  189. faith and credit of the defendant also defrauds the justice court insofar as the

  190. proceeding was permitted to be conducted in accordance with the faith and credit

  191. of the court. That the rent amount was listed as “$0.00” also compels consideration

  192. of the implications in the event of an act of fraud permitting for a

  193. mischaracterization of “default” to occur. The defendant contended at the time of

  194. her appeal to the federal district court on Sept. 7, 2021 that this was a criminal

  195. matter and not an eviction proceeding. The defendant also informed the attorney

  196. for the plaintiff of this contention on July 15, 2021 after the receipt of the July 12,

  197. 2021 “Notice to Vacate” as it was suspected as being an effort to obstruct an

  198. ongoing case that had been submitted to the federal district court for which a

  199. judgment was delivered in the time during which this unconstitutional proceeding

  200. was being engaged. The Sept. 3, 2021 court proceeding in the justice court occured

  201. 18 days after the judgment in a case that was itself against representatives of the

  202. State of Texas and had been pending in the federal district court. That case,

  203. however, would also have meant that the judgment was delivered 15 days BEFORE

  204. the implementation of the law change that was what the defendant contends is the

  205. matter at hand herein went into effect. That case was still within its appeal period

  206. during the timeframe that the court proceeding took place, meaning the

  207. implications of “securities fraud’ committed in the justice court have bearing on the

  208. case before the court against representatives of the State of Texas.

  209.  

  210. The defendant submitted her affidavit to the court under other rules of the court

  211. and in consideration of an appropriate process for proceeding as pertains to a

  212. homestead claim as opposed to a landlord/tenant relationship or a mortgage. That

  213. affidavit, however, and the appeal in the federal district court would have been

  214. sufficient to meet the legal determination for proceeding in the form of a pauper,

  215. especially in the the void of any effort to adequately address the matters pertaining

  216. to the plaintiff’s attempt to enforce an eviction for lack of rent payment when the

  217. amount of the rent was listed as “$0.00.” The defendant contends, however, that in

  218. addition to the evidence that was illegally acquired and stolen in the course of an

  219. appeal, that there was substantial property of the defendant’s onsite that was

  220. worth a considerable amount of money and for which receipts and inventories that

  221. had already been created and were onsite were stolen. Additionally, the fact that

  222. the defendant’s personal identification documents were also stolen and have until

  223. this time been refused return is further evidence of the intent to attempt to elicit a

  224. bond on the faith and credit of the defendant in an intentional and willful effort to

  225. engage acts of securities fraud and other crimes. It is now more than three and a

  226. half years since identification documentation was stolen and the court has refused

  227. to order the plaintiff to return it. In that time, defendant is not legally eligible to

  228. record more than “$0.00” of “income” as part of an employment arrangement, even

  229. if she went “downtown.”

  230.  

  231.  

  232. Rule 749. May Appeal – Opinions of Subcommittee on Interpretation of Rules

  233.  

  234. Bond

  235.  

  236. The plaintiff or landlord in a forcible entry and detainer suit must give an appeal

  237. bond in order to appeal to the County Court. 6 Texas B.J. 49 (1943); 8 Texas B.J. 31

  238. (1945).

  239.  

  240. 1988 Amendment

  241.  

  242. Rewrote the first paragraph which previously related to a motion for a new trial not

  243. being necessary to authorize an appeal added the last paragraph [sic].

  244.  

  245. Source

  246.  

  247. Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. Art. 3987.

  248.  

  249.  

  250. As can be seen via the official determination above, in order for a suit for forcible

  251. entry and detainer to be commenced, the plaintiff must provide the bond. The

  252. defendant contends that the plaintiff intentionally engaged a suit under false

  253. pretenses to elicit a bond on the faith and credit of the defendant. That the justice

  254. court refused the affidavit and that the defendant had to appeal “downtown” (as in

  255. the federal district court) also provides evidence of the charges, including that in

  256. previous suits before the federal district court the defendant’s efforts to proceed as

  257. the petitioner were permitted to proceed “in forma pauperis” or via an affidavit

  258. regarding “inability to pay filing fees” but was NOT accepted in the appeal of this

  259. matter, despite the affidavit being accepted as part of the case that was filed in the

  260. federal district court. Defendant also contends that NO information on alleged

  261. “lawyer’s fees” or the costs of “filing fees” by the plaintiff has been provided, while

  262. billing records and other financial information about the defendant – including in

  263. regards to costs associated with her other efforts to file via the federal district court

  264. as well as the Supreme Court of Texas and the Supreme Court of the United States

  265. in the time since when she had moved into the premises – had been stolen.

  266. Defendant contends that the plaintiff bears responsibility for the costs of the

  267. appeal as well as the costs of the damages accorded in the context of the

  268. unconstitutional proceeding itself.

  269.  

  270.  

  271. Rule 749c. Appeal Perfected

  272.  

  273. When an appeal bond has been timely filed in conformity with Rule 749 or a

  274. pauper’s affidavit approved in conformity with Rule 749a, the appeal shall be

  275. perfected.

  276.  

  277. May 9, 1977, eff. Sept. 1, 1977; Amended by orders of April 15, 1982, eff. Aug. 15, 1982;

  278. April 24, 1990; eff. Sept. 1, 1990.

  279. 1990 Amendment

  280.  

  281. Rewrote rule which prior thereto read:

  282.  

  283. “The appeal in any forcible detainer case shall be perfected when an appeal  bond

  284. has been filed.

  285.  

  286. “When a pauper’s affidavit has been filed in lieu of the appeal bond, the appeal

  287. shall be perfected when the pauper’s affidavit is filed with the court; however,

  288. when the case involves nonpayment of rent, such appeal is perfected when the

  289. pauper’s affidavit has been filed and when one rental period’s rent has been paid

  290. into the justice court registry. In a case where the pauper’s affidavit is contested by

  291. the landlord, the appeal shall be perfected when the contest is overruled, and if the

  292. case involves nonpayment of rent, one rental period’s rent has been paid into the

  293. justice county registry.”

  294.  

  295.  

  296. Defendant contends that just as in the manner in which the Sept. 3, 2021 court

  297. proceeding is implicated in the charges regarding the case for which the district

  298. court allegedly issued a judgment on Aug. 16, 2021, that the Fifth Circuit Court of

  299. Appeals and the April 1, 2022 judgment is likewise implicated. That the case was

  300. remanded by the federal district court to the local justice court recurrently and the

  301. means by which it was allowed to be taken for delivery by the Fifth Circuit Court of

  302. Appeals demonstrates that the appeal period for the matter is still pending and

  303. that the jurisdiction for the case is in the federal district court, not the local justice

  304. court. Additionally, defendant contends that the case is not a case regarding a

  305. landlord/tenant relationship, but an attempt to defraud a mortgage claim and

  306. commit violations of the law that legally constitute criminal acts of securities fraud

  307. and other crimes. As such, this case is not appropriate for a civil court but is

  308. appropriate for a criminal court of consideration.

  309.  

  310. At this time, defendant requests that the court approve this case for transfer to a

  311. criminal court while also granting relief to the defendant by returning her to her

  312. property and granting a restraining order against the plaintiff during the pendency

  313. of the criminal proceeding. The defendant also requests the court enjoin anyone

  314. else subsequent to the July 12, 2021 “Notice to Vacate” from access to or

  315. consideration in regards to any benefit related to these charges. These requests are

  316. within the court’s jurisdiction to grant.

  317.  

  318.  

  319. /s/: Charity Colleen Crouse

  320. 5916 Birchbrook Dr., 3231

  321. Dallas, TX 75206

  322. (469) 372-7853

  323. charity.colleen.crouse@outlook.com

  324.  3:59 pm CST

  325. April 21, 2022

  326.  

  327.  13 days as of April 8, 2025.

  328.  

  329. You would have stolen from our children that much?

  330. Does that mean you are holding Justice Busby hostage at your whorehouse?

  331. I can come in after him…

  332.  

  333. 10:46 am CST

  334. April 4, 2025

  335. President Charity Colleen “Lovejoy” Crouse

  336.  

     

  337. 12:41 pm CST

  338. April 6, 2025

  339. President Charity Colleen “Lovejoy” Crouse AKA Charity Colleen Crouse

  340. /s/: Charity Colleen Crouse

 

 

Posted public at 12:55 pm CST (3 - 1:06 pm on 4.6.2025)

April 6, 2025

President Charity Colleen "Lovejoy" Crouse

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