Regarding Justice John McLean’s Opinion in the Dred Scott Case - 2.16.2024

​

Yesterday at around 12:45 pm CST I read aloud the opinion by Justice McLean in the Dred Scott case. I had already printed it out earlier but had not yet read it through for specific reasons. Yesterday was the correct time. 

 

I did not stop and reply while reading it. That is not something I usually do. I did not because I recognized the authority and the "gravamen” immediately. It was one of the most difficult things I have ever done. It had a physical impact on me after I finished. It stands on its own.

 

Firstly: A few things were presented in the opinion that are absolutely essential for consideration at this time (and well have been ever since it was issued):

 

1. That insofar as anyone would identify that they had a claim to the Republic of Texas – including in manners that “grandfather” in their claims from before the annexation, statehood, or the later succession convention – then one forfeits that claim if they ever accept a “slave bond” or engage acts of slavery. 

2. That the qualifications for justifying “slave claims” regarding acts that predate the Articles of Confederation are moot, as the premise upon which the claims are made are under British law and were established in the McLean opinion as not permitting for slavery, or manumission of slavery, under the pretense that British law or contracts covered them. McLean also details how such claims are invalid concerning contracts that were engaged with or through France or Spain.

3. That no “in rem” proceeding can engage acts of slavery, as CONSENT is required for engaging an “in rem” proceeding and any efforts to engage “in rem” without consent qualifies as mutiny or attempted mutiny, for which the punishment is death (McLeans specifically calls out “piracy”). Recall that at the Continental Congress during which the Declaration of Independence was authored, Jefferson forewarned of the consequences for slavery on July 2. I contend it was never allowed to be “edited out” after it was written and that McLean identifies WHY. McClean does not cite this incident involving Jefferson but does provide citation from writings of Madison that correlate with those of Jefferson at that time and later.

4. That McLean outlines a specific argument for how a State Constitutional question becomes relevant and falls within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and that such argument actually applies in my cases, including regarding Crouse v. the Texas State Senate. 

5. That the authors of the majority opinion disqualify themselves as authorities by virtue of the argument McLean provides concerning the political justification for the authorship of the majority opinion which does not comport with the constitutional process. This is not just a matter of procedural disqualification and is akin in certain respects to how Justice Antonin Scalia outlines his dissent in Maryland v. King. I contend that McLean’s dissent actually provides a Constitutional justification for challenging the authority of the alleged “majority opinion” and vacating it.

 

9:29 am CST

Feb. 17, 2024

Co-President Charity Colleen “Lovejoy” Crouse

 

Secondly: Now, one thing not identified in the McLean opinion is whether there is any actual Constitutionally justifiable crime for which “slavery” can be sentenced as a punishment. The important matter here is the manner in which the crime was proven, as well as the crime itself. As I have said, COVID-19 has provided another manner in which to consider the implications of the Fifth Amendment when it comes to “self-incrimination” and what would otherwise be excepted as “hearsay” when it comes to evidence. As McLean recounts, prior to Dred Scott a  number of cases had been determined regarding slavery that involved acts of slavery that were illegal for years – up to 20 years – while they were occurring. 

 

Of specific concern is the manners in which McLean identifies “municipal” versus “state law” and the context within which territorial jurisdiction by the federal government was asserted prior to officially establishing state jurisdiction. The distinction between “municipal law” without a state in a territory versus “municipal law” within a state is the primary factor herein. This calls out the effect of the function of local municipal officials when it comes to providing the means by which violations of law can occur without enforcement of the law. 

 

Considerations of “reparations” or restitution for the victim need to be addressed in such regard. That local “officials” of the state would permit for violations of the law – whether state law or federal law – calls into question the authority of those officials in performance of their government duties, including insofar as they would otherwise assert themselves to qualify for the protections of immunity. Hence, it is NOT covered by the Eleventh Amendment and established precedent for asserting preclusion from prosecution under the Eleventh Amendment. Insofar as slavery was identified as a state right and that the “emancipation” of slaves as a “positive right” of both the slaveholder and the slave, then any obstruction of the exercise of the right by local officials calls into consideration in what capacity are they performing the acts. Performing in a proprietary capacity – including one that is applied in according to a specific individual a property or commercial right – is not the same as performing a government duty. I contend that enforcing a slave claim would be a performance of a proprietary act and hence does not qualify as a governmental duty and hence disqualifies coverage under the Eleventh Amendment. 

​

As for the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment implications is the consideration of the enforcement of a “positive right” – does one have the right not to “act” upon a “positive right?” Insofar as other precedent has been established, for one to refuse to act upon the positive right one has does not permit for them to obstruct another from acting upon a positive right. The emancipation elements of laws regarding precedents on slavery by state are rights for both the slaveholder and the slave. Even if it should be determined that one is not required to act upon a positive right (ie., the slaveholder by virtue of entering the state with intent to establish residency with the slave automatically emancipates the slave) one cannot obstruct the positive right of another. Additionally, as the McLean opinion identifies, there is no “manumission” once one enters the state and is emancipated – one cannot engage slavery of a free person. With the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, each state is put beyond the purview of attempting to assert individual state claims for slavery. There is no “reversion” into slavery.   

​

It is important that McLean does not limit the implications of slavery AS APPLIED in the colonies and in the states of the United States to “negro persons” but also identifies “white persons” as those who would otherwise be considered in the content of slavery as a slave. While he does not distinguish in the opinion between “indentured servitude” or slavery – including insofar as it includes who would otherwise be the inheritors of the slaves themselves – he makes clear that there is no expectation for one race over or in context to another. Additionally, as concerns the issue of women, he identifies the rights of access to the federal courts for women in manners that compel an understanding that the federal court system regarding rights to marriage and family are accorded to women as well as men, regardless of race. There is no distinction regarding the rights of women to the courts as regards the rights to men; insofar as the courts would accord women or men a right that would be denied another that would be a legislative matter. That there may be and may have been laws that do not accord rights to participate in the electoral process to women or to certain men are also legislative matters. The course of considering legislative change, however, was laid out in the opinion and the current rights of one based upon their association with historical right or disenfranchisement of a right are comparable and compatible with the manner in which McLean identifies the right to slavery. 

​

9:50 am CST

Feb. 17, 2024

Co-President Charity Colleen “Lovejoy” Crouse

​

Thirdly: Treaties as “international law”  – including the importation or enjoyment of “slaves” by virtue of association with or through another country. As McLean states, insofar as a foreigner would bring a slave into the United States, then insofar as he does the slave is emancipated in the same manner that a resident would be. The laws regarding residency and immigration for foreigners do not permit for a right to be extended to the foreigner in matters pertaining to slavery that would not be available to a citizen of the United States. 

​

9:53 am CST

Feb. 17, 2024

Co-President Charity Colleen “Lovejoy” Crouse

​

One minute.

​

Posted 10:11 am CST

Feb. 17, 2024

Co-President Charity Colleen "Lovejoy" Crouse