On June 24, 2019, The Supreme Court of the United States issued an opinion in the case Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Media. The majority opinion, written by Justice Neil Gorsuch and supported by five other Justices, discusses concerns around proprietary processes of categorizing and utilizing data regarding purchases made by the SNAP program. A request had been made for specific data concerning what was allowed to be acquired and analyzed by Argus Media company and the company claimed exception to release of information based upon arguments concerning protections of trade secrets.

For anyone who has been involved with a public assistance program that either offers or requires access to the SNAP program — often referred to as “food stamps” — one knows that the process by which to apply for the benefits entails specific documentation that may differ from place to place, including state to state. The state of Illinois, for instance, at least as of 2016, required one to fill out a more than 20-page application that among other things had a section for providing information regarding one’s relationship with designated Native American tribes. Specifically striking in this regard was a question asking how much, if any, one had obtained in “royalties” on “tribal artifacts.” The application in Texas, at least as of 2017, is different. Among one of the things it does, however, is implicitly require for one who acquires SNAP benefits to provide access to ANY other database with which SNAP recipients engage upon request from those in-network as a provider of services, including via connection with the individual’s MediCare access.

But another thing that SNAP benefits do is, when available, provide recipients with free cell phone access. This phone program has been in effect throughout most of the time during which the Affordable Care Act was in effect. I personally have seen the sign-ups for these phones in six cities in two states. Presumably, one can only acquire one such phone a year from the specific provider, however, there is more than one company that provides such phones. The type of phone one can access initially might have limited features, but once one signs up for the services, there is available a sim card that can be put into another phone when it is made available.

Currently, there is an executive from Argus Media listed as on the Executive Board of the National Petroleum Council. Little has been explicitly discussed about the relationship between members of the gas and oil industry and their direct or indirect relationship to provision of social services for people in the United States or elsewhere. Even less, however, has been said about the specific relationship between the gas and oil sector and food access. I contend that inherent in this case and its decisions are many concerns that were inappropriately attended to previously regarding the pertinent issues it raises. They come in the course of events regarding numerous cases at even the level of the Supreme Court of the United States that have thusfar erred in providing the focus we need.

At this time, it is crucial to contextualize this within two major patterns – one federal and one more localized specific to the State of Texas. It is important to understand that Justices of the Supreme Court
preside over a certain territory. Justice Gorsuch presides over the district he came into following the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, which included the State of Texas. At the time that Justice Gorsuch was appointed to the bench, the State of Texas was in the course of a specific trajectory that shows parallels with what is discernible in the opinion provided in Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Media. I contend this is alarming for several reasons which will be discussed below.

In the case law references provided in Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Media there is a noticeable correlation with a sort of visualization that comports itself in the form of a house, or building structured with four pillars and a fixture atop. The four pillars of these cases concern companies that supply the military, including provision of weapons. Then is also a fifth case, whose potential utility when appropriately contextualized reveals a more distinct visualization regarding the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I have been analyzing trends in case law references regarding both the positioning of the named plaintiff and the defendant as well as the company or person named with regards to more than just the legal precedent. In consideration of this specific case and the aforementioned qualifiers, there is a major concern when evaluated relative to the concurrent patterns in cases regarding the State of Texas.

Beginning at the end of 2017, the Vernon’s Legal Codes Annotated version for the State of Texas demonstrated what I suspected was a pattern regarding the references it made to cases under consideration for certain areas of law wherein changes had been made for the year. I noticed that the structure presented for the State of Texas was distinct from at least the States of Illinois and Florida when I attempted to evaluate the Vernon’s books for those states, for the same time periods, and in regard to the same areas of law. Sections regarding “public information” under the Texas Government Code showed a sort of staggered effect that juxtaposed cases for whistleblower complaints primarily regarding people who worked at local Independent School Districts with two different cases regarding a “trade secrets” dispute between the State of Texas and Boeing for a facility near Foot Hood in San Antonio, Texas. By 2018, these case references had changed, but only slightly; the pattern of staggering cases regarding ISDs with the cases regarding Boeing persisted. While I have not been thusfar able to access the 2020 Vernon’s Legal Codes, I did see that for a third year during 2019 the same process was at work. That would mean that while the case for Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Media was being considered at the level of the Supreme Court of the United States and during the time frame in which the opinion was issued and delivered, this pattern would have been in effect.

My personal experiences with attempting to navigate the various systems throughout the State of Texas, including ones that would provide or require access to public information from government agencies, led me to believe that there had been put into place a sort of automation that actually hedged on patterns connected to the “keys” associated with the decisions in these cases. It was as if a very comprehensive “pipeline” had been set up, including understanding when and how and in what manner one could obtain what was needed at one location as opposed to another based upon how one performed in accordance with queues associated with derivatives of what was actually being sought. My investigation of what I referred to as a “pattern of racketeering activity” in my formal efforts to engage in and through the judicial process starting in 2017 – including an effort to directly petition the Supreme Court of the United States in October of 2017 – involved an examination of this scheme regarding manners in which people were denied what they needed unless they agreed to cooperate with acquisition of other items or information, including items that may be illegal or at the least beyond the explicit purview of the specific provider being engaged at the time. It created a systematology for a kickback scheme that persisted for at least three years that I was able to observe while I was trying to address my own resource needs based upon intersection with the various entities of concern and while I had access to public legal information, including primary source documents and reference materials.

The elements of the Boeing cases in consideration of the specifics of some of the cases regarding the ISD whistleblower claims should have compelled considerable attention by someone in the legal community that had access to these materials and had experience with the legal filing process. I contend that what was occurring was a gradual process of subsuming whistleblower claims into and through the Texas retirement system based upon applications of technologies that were in part acquired in connection with the processes described and outlined in the argumentation of the Boeing cases. This is not only about the retirement system, but I believe the automation incentivized cooperation by personnel at the various agencies based upon the alleged benefits accorded to considerations of employee participation and identification of and as success in meeting indicators that correlated with this automated processing. This is not to say that Boeing specifically provided the materials or the processes itself, but that the Boeing cases provided a means by which to acquire and/or to connect suppliers of materials that were needed to effectuate its accomplishment, including in cooperation with the surveillance infrastructure at particular buildings or in “public areas.”
 

The State of Texas has specific laws regarding access to and use of biometric accounts connected to public resource access under the auspices of “security” paradigms that are not disclosed. How many people have been put into syndicates of “automated” performance when it comes to accessing their resource needs and in what manners those resource needs are manipulated to effectuate arrangements that are not consented to or known by the person involved is also not disclosed. And, in the course of the last three years, Texas has passed legislation regarding “disclosure” of information – or rather, refusal to disclose information – that was previously legally required or Constitutionally mandated without regard to the impact it has on people whom have not been informed of these changes. Certain aspects, for example, of the Texas Government Code regarding information connected to contract bidding have themselves been put on a staggered multi-year cycle wherein increasing amounts and types of information are removed from the purview of mandates to disclose to the public. These changes began on Sept. 1, 2019 with updates to occur annually for four years starting Jan. 1, 2020 and ending Jan. 1, 2024. The changes which are in effect now include preclusions on providing location or contact information regarding certain entities involved with contract bidding as well as settlement terms regarding certain cases involving political subdivisions.

I contend these “changes” are not only Unconstitutional but reveal a premeditated conspiracy to engage in intentionally illegal changes to the law in order to exacerbate the implications of the automation that had already been at work. To what aim would such feats be performed and attempted for engagement? In 2003, there was a change to law in Texas regarding the establishment of a Gubernatorial commission regarding biotechnology, biomedicine, bioengineering and nanotechnology. The original declaration for the commission was provided in the aspects of the Texas Business Code that introduced the laws regarding qualification for consideration as a small business. Later changes have put the commission under another rubric and have removed the explicit origins involving its original supplanting of the introduction to the small business code for several years. Nonetheless, the status of this commission is not disclosed at this time and to this day I have found no reports on its activities.

This is not acceptable. For consideration I provide a question about priorities. In February of 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States considered a case, General Dynamics v. the United States, regarding not “trade secrets” but other manners in which the government could justify keeping specific information classified from contractors involved with providing items or services connected to areas or needs associated with specific classifications of “national security.” But ten years later, the Supreme Court of the United States is opining on a case regarding jurisdiction when it comes to impounding a motor vehicle that has been repossessed after a default, Chicago v. Fulton. Is this connected to the changes in the Texas Insurance Code regarding the priority consideration of “auto insurance” that replaced much of the insurance code since numerous changes went into effect in 2001?

Cancel the contract with whoever it was that was permitted to illegally surveil me and steal my reading of Chicago v. Fulton, as well as the two cases from July and November of 2020 regarding second amendment arguments on rights to self-defense, including defense against extortion through fear of economic harm based upon abuse of office engaged willfully through acts of fraud and deceit aimed at dispossessing people of their private property.

12:35 am CST
April 7, 2021
Finished initial proofreading at 12:51 am CST on April 7, 2021
Final edit 10:24 am CST on April 7, 2021
Format at 11:19 am CST on April 7, 2021

​

See here.